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Working Themselves Impure: A Life Cycle 
Theory of Legal Theories 
Jeremy K. Kessler† & David E. Pozen†† 
Prescriptive legal theories have a tendency to cannibalize themselves. As they 
develop into schools of thought, they become not only increasingly complicated but 
also increasingly compromised, by their own normative lights. Maturation breeds 
adulteration. The theories work themselves impure. 
This Article identifies and diagnoses this evolutionary phenomenon. We de-
velop a stylized model to explain the life cycle of certain particularly influential legal 
theories. We illustrate this life cycle through case studies of originalism, textualism, 
popular constitutionalism, and cost-benefit analysis, as well as a comparison with 
leading accounts of organizational and theoretical change in politics and science. 
And we argue that an appreciation of the life cycle counsels a reorientation of legal 
advocacy and critique. The most significant threats posed by a new legal theory do 
not come from its neglect of significant first-order values—the usual focus of criti-
cism—for those values are apt to be incorporated into the theory. Rather, the deeper 
threats lie in the second- and third-order social, political, and ideological effects that 
the adulterated theory’s persistence may foster down the line. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When originalism burst onto the scene in the 1970s and 
1980s, it promised to stabilize constitutional law and rein in 
judges by tying interpretation to the Framers’ “original inten-
tions.” Critics complained that this approach slighted the Consti-
tution’s popular character and could justify intolerable out-
comes, such as racially segregated schools. Originalism 
subsequently reoriented itself around “original public meaning” 
and the interpretation/construction distinction—blunting some of 
the earlier criticisms and broadening the theory’s appeal, but 
at significant cost to its motivating principles of certainty and 
constraint.1 
When cost-benefit analysis (CBA) burst back onto the scene 
in the 1980s, it promised to rationalize the regulatory state and 
rein in administrators by demanding adherence to a scientifically 
informed, quantitative methodology. Critics complained that this 
approach slighted the importance of nonwelfarist concerns and 
could justify intolerable outcomes, such as gross violations of hu-
man dignity. CBA subsequently incorporated deontological and 
 
 1 See Part III.A. 
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distributive elements—blunting some of the earlier criticisms and 
broadening the theory’s appeal, but at significant cost to its moti-
vating principles of efficiency and expertise.2 
When popular constitutionalism burst onto the scene in the 
2000s, it promised to democratize constitutional law by displacing 
the court-centered perspective of judges and scholars and return-
ing the Constitution to the people. Critics complained that this 
approach slighted the role of courts in protecting minority rights 
and could justify intolerable outcomes, such as mob rule. Popular 
constitutionalism subsequently shifted its focus from ordinary cit-
izens to government institutions—blunting some of the earlier 
criticisms and broadening the theory’s appeal, but at significant 
cost to its motivating principles of lay participation and control.3 
In this Article, we argue that these episodes reflect a general 
tendency of prescriptive legal theories, when they blossom into 
intellectual movements or schools of thought, to shed many of the 
core commitments that made the theories attractive in the first 
place. As they develop over time, that is, these theories become not 
only increasingly complicated but also increasingly compromised, 
by their own normative lights. Maturation breeds adulteration. 
The theories work themselves impure. 
The tendency of prescriptive legal theories4 to work them-
selves impure mirrors the tendency of legal rules to evolve into 
standards.5 It also has analogues in political science and the his-
tory and philosophy of science.6 Yet while we will suggest that the 
process of impurification can affect nearly all prescriptive projects 
 
 2 See Part III.D. 
 3 See Part III.C. 
 4 By “prescriptive,” we mean “[e]xpressing what must or should be done” by official 
actors in a given area of regulation, interpretation, or enforcement. Black’s Law Dictionary 
1374 (West 10th ed 2014) (defining “prescriptive”). See also Part I.B (identifying conditions 
under which ostensibly descriptive theories may undergo the life cycle). By “legal theo-
ries,” we mean coherent groups of propositions that are put forward to guide or explain 
particular sets of legal practices. This understanding of theory is broader than the under-
standings that prevail in some other disciplines, which emphasize testability and falsifi- 
ability, but it is consistent with legal academic usage. See Lee Epstein and Gary King, The 
Rules of Inference, 69 U Chi L Rev 1, 61 n 188 (2002) (criticizing legal scholarship for de-
fining theory more expansively than other disciplines). But see H.M. Collins, Changing 
Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice 34–46 (Sage 1985) (questioning the 
significance of falsifiability for theorizing in the natural sciences); Peter Winch, The Idea 
of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy 91–94 (Routledge 2d ed 1990) (question-
ing the significance of falsifiability for theorizing in the social sciences). We consider the 
relationship between legal and scientific theory development in Part IV.C. 
 5 See Part IV.A.1. 
 6 See Parts IV.B–C. 
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(and many ostensibly descriptive projects) to some extent,7 there 
is a subset of legal theories that are especially likely to work them-
selves very impure: those theories that seek to negotiate highly 
politicized legal conflicts through the introduction of decision- 
making frameworks that abstract away from the central values 
in contention. Thus, originalism appealed to the authority of a 
univocal constitutional text in response to the conflict sparked by 
the Warren and Burger Courts’ expansion of the rights of minor-
ities, women, criminal defendants, and the poor. CBA turned to 
the language of economics in response to the conflict sparked by 
the activism of agencies tasked with protecting health, safety, and 
the environment. And popular constitutionalism heralded the 
emergence of a demotic formalism—“the people themselves”—in 
response to the conflict sparked by the Rehnquist Court’s rollback 
of federal regulatory power. 
We submit that the prescriptive legal theories that have 
gained the broadest support in public law fields over the past sev-
eral decades have shared these features of abstraction and proce-
duralism, together with a common life cycle:8 
Birth—At T1, the theory9 introduces a decision procedure or 
criterion for judgment that seeks to resolve a highly politi-
cized legal conflict in terms that are relatively alien to the 
main points of political contention; in so doing, the theory dif-
ferentiates itself from preexisting legal theories used to ne-
gotiate the conflict. 
Critique—At T2, critics of the theory highlight its failure to 
secure certain values that gave rise to the conflict in the first 
place. 
Reformulation—At T3, the theory responds to these critiques 
by internalizing them—supplementing or modifying its ap-
proach so as to better serve the initially ignored values. As a 
 
 7 Among theories with staying power, the principal exceptions either do not seek to 
resolve politically contentious legal debates or seek to do so directly, by offering arguments 
that on their face support one side of the debate or the other. We discuss these exceptions 
in Part I.B. 
 8 We are grateful to John Danaher for suggesting names for the stages of the life 
cycle in an insightful blog post. John Danaher, The Life Cycle of Prescriptive (Legal) Theories 
(Philosophical Disquisitions, May 26, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/V6D9-P6C8. 
 9 “The theory” invoked here is a shorthand for the overlapping efforts of an array of 
theorists, whose individual arguments and motivations may differ and whose identities 
may change over time. We explain why this internal heterogeneity does not defeat the 
possibility of an overarching life cycle, and on the contrary facilitates it, in Parts I.C and II. 
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result, the theory’s constituency expands, but at the price of 
normative and conceptual purity. 
Iteration—At T4, this process of criticism and response recurs. 
Maturity—At T5, the theory has come to reflect the conflict-
ridden political and theoretical field it had promised to 
transcend. To the extent the theory ever posed a direct threat 
to particular participants in the underlying conflict, that dan-
ger has dwindled. 
Death or Adulterated Persistence—At T6, the theory either 
falls out of favor with mainstream legal actors, at least for 
the time being, or persists in substantially adulterated 
form.10 
If this life cycle model accurately captures the developmental 
history of some of the most influential public law theories in re-
cent memory—including not only originalism, CBA, and popular 
constitutionalism but also the new textualism and possibly others—
then a number of conclusions follow. First, legal theory entrepre-
neurs are, in general, too optimistic about the transformative 
power of their theories. Theories of the sort we describe are un-
likely to escape the horizon of the conflicts in which they inter-
vene. Instead, the theories are likely to be transformed by the 
conflicts, eventually recapitulating rather than resolving the un-
derlying political disputes. 
Second, critics of new prescriptive legal theories are, in gen-
eral, too pessimistic about the impact such theories will have. Any 
theory that successfully attracts a large number of adherents is 
 
 10 In a short essay from 1982, Professor Duncan Kennedy suggested that all funda-
mental distinctions that “constitute the liberal way of thinking about the social world,” 
such as public versus private and freedom versus coercion, undergo “an invariant sequence 
of six stages . . . from robust good health to utter decrepitude.” Duncan Kennedy, The 
Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U Pa L Rev 1349, 1349–50 
(1982). We follow Kennedy in combining internalist and externalist modes of analysis to 
account for the transformation of legal concepts over time. For an explanation of these 
terms, see Mark Tushnet, Book Review, The New Deal Constitutional Revolution: Law, 
Politics, or What?, 66 U Chi L Rev 1061, 1061 (1999) (explaining that “[e]xternalists de-
scribe developments outside the law and the courts to explain [legal] change,” while “in-
ternalists . . . emphasize the role that reasoned distinctions . . . play”) (emphases omitted). 
We focus, however, on a different set of transformations and a different set of external 
factors. Whereas Kennedy sought to explain what he took to be the decline of the liberal 
legal worldview as such, our life cycle theory aims to explain the divergent fates of con-
temporary prescriptive legal theories—all of which operate within the tenets of the liberal 
legal worldview, however “decrepit” those tenets might appear from other perspectives. 
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liable to undergo a process of refinement and revision, if not out-
right appropriation, that will come over time to undermine its 
formative goals. An appreciation of these dynamics clarifies con-
nections between legal theorizing and other types of theorizing, 
and it might help to lower the temperature of some of the legal 
academy’s most heated debates. 
Third, the belief that law can “work itself pure” ironically un-
derwrites the contradictions and compromises of prescriptive le-
gal theories.11 Those theories that suggest that a divisive legal 
practice can be redeemed, and political debate quieted, through 
the adoption of proper decisionmaking techniques always already 
contain the seeds of their own decay. There may be an inescapable 
trade-off between a legal theory’s ambition to transcend social 
conflict and its susceptibility to impurification. 
And fourth, the persistence of ever-more-adulterated legal 
theories cannot be explained by broad acceptance of their initial 
normative commitments, for the price of persistence is the unrav-
eling of those commitments. When such theories endure, we can 
expect to find them serving interests or ideals exogenous to their 
stated aims. The continuing bipartisan embrace of originalism, 
for instance, may be bolstered by its tendency to enhance the po-
litical prestige of lawyers or the moral prestige of American na-
tionalism. In any event, the real basis for the persistence of an 
adulterated prescriptive legal theory—and the real stakes of that 
theory’s persistence—will be only dimly illuminated by the theory 
itself. 
 
 11 The idea that law, and the common law in particular, “works itself pure” is at least 
as old as Lord Mansfield’s declaration from the bench in Omychund v Barker, 26 Eng Rep 
15, 23 (Ch 1744) (Mansfield) (emphasis omitted). Two centuries later, Professor Lon Fuller 
made this idea famous within the American legal academy. See Lon L. Fuller, The Law in 
Quest of Itself 140 (Foundation 1940) (“[T]he common law works itself pure and adapts 
itself to the needs of a new day.”). See also Frederick Schauer, Thinking like a Lawyer: A 
New Introduction to Legal Reasoning 105 (Harvard 2009) (noting Fuller’s influence). 
Fuller’s effort to incorporate legal realism’s understanding of the social function of law 
within a procedural account of legal autonomy has, in turn, been recognized as an im-
portant contributor to the rise of the legal process school. See Neil Duxbury, Patterns of 
American Jurisprudence 261 & n 383 (Clarendon 1995). As discussed in Part I.A, today’s 
leading public law theories have important affinities with process jurisprudence in their 
aspiration to resolve politically contentious legal conflicts by means of politically neutral 
procedural norms. Today’s theories likewise share with earlier accounts of the common 
law a belief in the internal rationality of law, although they break with the common-law 
model in seeking to fix a unified decision procedure at the outset rather than refine legal 
doctrine in an incremental, case-by-case fashion. 
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In making these claims, we are aware that theories are not 
conscious agents with goals, motivations, or the like. Public law 
scholars frequently anthropomorphize the ideas and institutions 
they study,12 so to a certain extent our association of legal theories 
with intentional states simply follows common parlance. But 
given that our life cycle model places special emphasis on a theory’s 
departure from “its own” earlier-in-time commitments, some fur-
ther clarification is in order. The life cycle model depends on the 
empirical claim, defended in Part III, that participants in early 
debates on originalism, textualism, popular constitutionalism, 
and CBA shared common understandings regarding what the theo-
ries were about: the reasons they were introduced and the reforms 
they would entail. Proponents and opponents of these theories 
disputed a great deal, but they agreed on the theories’ central pur-
poses and prescriptions. That agreement is what made debates 
over the theories’ merits intelligible. Such common understand-
ings about a theory in its formative years can be recovered and 
held up to scrutiny in light of subsequent developments. 
We are also keenly aware that the evolutionary process we 
describe may produce benefits for law and knowledge, a point ad-
dressed in Part V. In light of these potential benefits, the lan-
guage of “impurity” may strike some readers as unduly pejorative. 
But we do not contend that impure theories are bad theories. We 
use the language of impurity, instead, to invite the comparison 
with accounts of the common law working itself pure and to un-
derscore the loss of normative and decisional clarity that attends 
theoretical maturation. A theory that has become impure in our 
sense, with an increasingly complex decision procedure and con-
tested normative valence, may well be more attractive than its 
“purer” predecessors. Alloys are often stronger than base metals. 
It is nonetheless important to keep track of what gets lost over 
the course of this progression if prescriptive legal theorists are to 
understand the structure of the practice in which they are engaged. 
 
 12 See, for example, Barry Friedman and Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitu-
tion, 147 U Pa L Rev 1, 33 (1998) (“Originalism seeks to keep faith with our Founders, 
while living constitutionalism seeks to keep pace with the times.”); Douglas A. Kysar, It 
Might Have Been: Risk, Precaution and Opportunity Costs, 22 J Land Use & Envir L 1, 42 
(2006) (“CBA aspires to achieve complete agent-neutrality.”). See also David E. Pozen, 
Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 Yale L J 2, 13 (2014) (“[T]he anthropomor-
phization of the branches is a standard move in constitutional theory.”). 
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I.  THE OBJECT OF THE LIFE CYCLE THEORY 
The life cycle outlined in the Introduction is not equally ap-
plicable to all legal theories. Rather, it best captures those theo-
ries marked by proceduralism and depoliticization: theories that 
seek to negotiate highly politicized legal conflicts through the in-
troduction of decisionmaking frameworks that abstract away 
from the central values in contention. This Part proposes to an-
swer why such theories should be privileged objects of analysis, 
why they are so susceptible to the impurification process, and why 
it is reasonable to treat each such theory as a unitary phenomenon. 
A. Proceduralism and Depoliticization in Contemporary Legal 
Theory 
We focus on theories that promise depoliticization through 
proceduralism not only because such theories are especially prone 
to the life cycle but also because, in our view, this style of theoriz-
ing is especially prominent in contemporary legal scholarship. 
Although nothing critical hangs on the exact chronology, one 
plausible candidate for dating the (re)emergence of this theoreti-
cal style is the 1980s. That decade began with the publication of 
Professor John Hart Ely’s landmark book, Democracy and Distrust. 
The book developed a justification for “representation-reinforcing” 
judicial review that attempted to square the Warren Court’s ap-
parent revival of natural law jurisprudence with the late-stage 
legal process theory of Ely’s mentor, Professor Alexander Bickel.13 
Within a few years, law review articles were heralding the advent 
of a “new legal process” or “new public law” program that sought 
to expand upon Ely’s defense of individual rights protection, while 
also modernizing process theory’s account of the administrative 
state in light of increasingly pointed critiques from public choice, 
law and economics, and critical legal studies (CLS).14 Even though 
 
 13 John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 101–02 
(Harvard 1980). 
 14 See generally William N. Eskridge Jr and Gary Peller, The New Public Law Move-
ment: Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 Mich L Rev 707 (1991); Daniel B. 
Rodriguez, Book Review, The Substance of the New Legal Process, 77 Cal L Rev 919 (1989); 
A. Michael Froomkin, Book Review, Climbing the Most Dangerous Branch: Legisprudence 
and the New Legal Process, 66 Tex L Rev 1071 (1988); Robert Weisberg, The Calabresian 
Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35 Stan L Rev 213 (1983). Scholars 
identified in the foregoing articles as participants in the new legal process include such 
diverse figures as Judge Guido Calabresi and Professors Bruce Ackerman, Robert Cover, 
William Eskridge, Owen Fiss, Philip Frickey, Gerald Frug, Jonathan Macey, Jerry 
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new legal process failed to coalesce as a coherent movement, it 
signaled a renewed interest in theories that attempt to vindicate 
select high-level values by perfecting the means by which govern-
ment officials reach legal decisions. 
Looking back further in time, one could argue that much con-
temporary legal theory is best understood as a development 
within the older legal process school of the 1950s and 1960s.15 Or 
one might argue that the “[p]uzzling [p]ersistence” of process-
based theories16 reflects a basic tendency within American legal 
culture, if not within law itself, to seek nominal reconciliation of 
competing views about the content of public policy; legal theorists 
are perpetually redescribing these first-order political conflicts 
as—and rerouting them into—comparatively esoteric debates 
about the allocation of institutional authority and the rationality 
of decisionmaking methods.17 Despite the plausibility of these two 
longer narratives, we find the 1980s origin story more felicitous 
because the immediately preceding decades remain the last era 
in which moralistic argument flowered in American public law.18 
 
Mashaw, Frank Michelman, Andrzej Rapaczynski, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Richard Stewart, 
and Cass Sunstein. On the mainstreaming of law and economics within the legal academy 
in the 1970s, see Steven M. Teles, The Rise of the Conservative Legal Movement: The Battle 
for Control of the Law 97–101 (Princeton 2008). 
 15 See, for example, Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 87 n 20 
(Harvard 1982) (arguing that “most current legal scholars, consciously or not, have fol-
lowed [the] path” of “the legal process school”); Eskridge and Peller, 89 Mich L Rev at 708 
(cited in note 14) (“[T]he legal process focus on institutional relationships, the process of 
lawmaking, and an overriding standard of purposive coherence continues to dominate pub-
lic law scholarship.”). Cutting against this story of continuity is the fact that the very no-
tion of a “process school” was mooted only in 1976. See G. Edward White, The American 
Judicial Tradition: Profiles of Leading American Judges 404 n 2 (Oxford 1976). See also 
Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence at 206 n 3 (cited in note 11) (identifying 
Professor G. Edward White as “[t]he writer who first suggested the existence of a process 
school”). This late historicization of process theory suggests that the concept itself may 
have been an artifact of critique and rehabilitation in the 1970s and 1980s. 
 16 Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theo-
ries, 89 Yale L J 1063, 1063–65 (1980). 
 17 See Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1870–1960: The Cri-
sis of Legal Orthodoxy 271 (Oxford 1992) (“The 1950s search for ‘neutral principles’ was 
just one more effort to separate law and politics in American culture, one more expression 
of the persistent yearning to find an olympian position from which to objectively cushion 
the terrors of social choice.”). 
 18 The 1980s also witnessed a growing prominence and institutionalization of public 
law argument by the political right—for example, through the rise of “second generation” 
conservative public interest law firms, see Teles, The Rise of the Conservative Legal Move-
ment at 220–64 (cited in note 14)—although our life cycle account is by no means limited 
to “conservative” legal theories. 
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The failure of the legal process synthesis to supply generally ac-
cepted standards for legal decisionmaking had become undeniable 
by the late 1960s, and in the wake of this failure came a series of 
“[a]ttempts to reinfuse constitutional law with principles of jus-
tice [that] persisted into and throughout the 1970s.”19 Representa-
tive of this shift were the many efforts made during this period to 
ground constitutional law in Rawlsian political philosophy.20 
But then the pendulum swung back.21 The public law theories 
that have gained the most traction since the 1970s have retreated 
from the open pursuit of justice in favor of a more formalistic, in-
stitutionalist orientation. Rawlsian theories of constitutional law 
are now a dim memory. So are Marxist and nihilist theories, for 
that matter.22 Like their counterparts in the “new legal process” 
fold,23 originalism, textualism, popular constitutionalism, and 
CBA eschew natural law notions and seek to transcend ordinary 
political divides—including the academic divide between “right-
wing” versions of law and economics and “explicitly leftist CLS”—
through the establishment of “particular procedures for reaching 
decisions about the terms of social life.”24 
Today’s leading public law theories depart from the old legal 
process in acknowledging the normativity of legal decisionmaking 
 
 19 Mark Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An Interpretation of Public 
Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 Tex L Rev 1307, 1316 (1979). 
 20 See id at 1316–21 (discussing the turn to Rawls). While Professor John Rawls 
sometimes characterized his theory of “justice as fairness” as “procedural,” John Rawls, A 
Theory of Justice 120 (Belknap 1971), it is generally understood to incorporate principles 
of substantive justice. See Joshua Cohen, Pluralism and Proceduralism, 69 Chi Kent L 
Rev 589, 595–97 (1994). See also John Rawls, Political Liberalism 422 n 68 (Columbia 
1996) (embracing Professor Joshua Cohen’s account of how “procedural justice depends on 
substantive justice”). 
 21 See Parts II.C, IV.A.2 (discussing connections between the life cycle of individual 
legal theories and the larger cycles and epicycles of public law theory). 
 22 See Tushnet, 57 Tex L Rev at 1309 (cited in note 19) (discussing the choice between 
“nihilism” and “Marxis[m]” that CLS would face in the 1980s). 
 23 Rodriguez, Book Review, 77 Cal L Rev at 919 n 2 (cited in note 14) (including theories 
of representation reinforcement, public choice, reconstitutive law, pragmatism, and repub-
licanism within the ambit of new legal process). 
 24 Eskridge and Peller, 89 Mich L Rev at 762–63 (cited in note 14) (discussing a range 
of “recent public law work” circa 1991). That this centrism mirrored traditional legal pro-
cess in its search for a middle ground between anti–New Deal formalism and pro–New 
Deal legal realism was not lost on proponents of new legal process. See id at 763–64 (stat-
ing that both sets of process-oriented theories “embody the attempt to mediate the ideo-
logical polarization of legal discourse”). 
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and accepting that “no issues are simply ‘procedural.’”25 For in-
stance, popular constitutionalism and originalism generally lo-
cate their legitimacy in popular sovereignty or popular ratifica-
tion of the Constitution, while CBA generally privileges the 
substantive norm of social welfare. Yet in their focus on the man-
ner in which legal authority is exercised, these theories have res-
urrected the process school’s founding commitment to the auton-
omous validity of law.26 Such theories are proceduralist to the 
extent that they define valid legal decisions as those reached by 
appropriate procedures or persons. Such theories are depoliti-
cized to the extent that the decisionmaking models they recognize 
as valid abstract from the politically divisive values at stake in a 
given legal conflict. 
In short, for all of its internal diversity, mainstream public 
law theory has operated within a certain template since at least 
the 1980s. This template seeks to accommodate normative con-
flict, linguistic indeterminacy, and regulatory complexity by 
means of proceduralism and depoliticization. The result is a rec-
ipe for impurification. 
B. Susceptibility to the Life Cycle 
Ever since the New Deal shifted the center of gravity in 
American law toward federal regulation, public law conflicts have 
garnered the lion’s share of political attention.27 Accordingly, one 
 
 25 Id at 762 (emphasis added). As critics noted, traditional process jurisprudence it-
self depended on an implicit normative account of the appropriate means and ends of legal 
process: “principle[d]” reasons of decision and “valid human wants.” Duxbury, Patterns of 
American Jurisprudence at 262–64 (cited in note 11) (emphases added). 
 26 In other words, today’s leading public law theories aim both to shore up weak-
nesses of the old legal process and to resist those intellectually extreme forms of law and 
economics and CLS that threaten the very enterprise of conventional legal scholarship and 
education. See Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law at 269–70 (cited in note 17) 
(describing law and economics, CLS, and various natural rights theories as the three main 
challengers to traditional legal process between 1960 and 1990). On the institutional and 
vocational imperatives that favored process jurisprudence, both at mid-century and during 
the 1980s, see Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale: 1927–1960 226–31 (North Carolina 1986). 
 27 See Grant Gilmore, The Ages of American Law 81–88 (Yale 2d ed 2014). See also 
Charles D. Breitel, The Lawmakers, 65 Colum L Rev 749, 766 (1965) (contrasting the ad-
judication of private law disputes with “the public and political controversy engendered by 
issues involved in public law”); Harold Hongju Koh, The Globalization of Freedom, 26 Yale 
J Intl L 305, 308 (2001) (noting “the major shift in the focus of American law school cur-
riculum and scholarship after the New Deal [ ] away from the teaching of private law to-
ward the teaching of public law”). 
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can expect a large and interested audience for any theory promis-
ing resolution of a significant public law controversy. And that is 
the implied promise of the theories we describe: by reorienting 
official practice around new methods or criteria for public law de-
cisionmaking, such theories hold out the hope of resolving politi-
cally contentious legal conflicts without reference to the primary 
values in contention. 
These theories are so susceptible to being compromised be-
cause of the way in which they seek to forge compromise. On the 
one hand, these theories inject reformist ideas into debates that 
are perceived to matter a great deal. Participants are likely to be 
sensitive to such efforts and to register their discontent if they 
suspect any given proposal of privileging certain interests at the 
expense of their own agendas. On the other hand, these theories 
intervene in an abstract fashion, without speaking directly to the 
issues that animate participants on either side. Originalism and 
popular constitutionalism, for example, supply guidance about 
how the Constitution should be interpreted and by whom, but 
they have nothing explicit to say about which substantive goods 
society should prioritize or what the legal rules should be regard-
ing abortion, health care, or any other public policy matter. This 
abstraction may reduce backlash in the short term, but it also cre-
ates conceptual space within the terms of the theory to incorpo-
rate competing perspectives on the underlying conflict. 
A fundamental tension emerges. The goal of proceduralism 
and depoliticization is to overcome, or appear to overcome, the di-
visions within a preexisting legal conflict. To achieve this goal, a 
theory must build a broad base of support that minimizes parti-
san taint. And so proceduralist, depoliticized theories must re-
spond to at least some of the criticisms that their initial formula-
tions engender. At the same time that this responsiveness allows 
the theories to broaden their bases, however, it leads them down 
the path of adulteration. The theories will become less purely pro-
cedural and more obviously charged with politically divisive 
meanings as newer iterations seek to appease constituencies that 
insist on the inviolability of various first-order commitments. 
Generally speaking, then, we have reason to predict (and case 
studies to suggest) that the legal theories most susceptible to the 
life cycle will be those that seek to negotiate highly politicized le-
gal conflicts by prescribing decisionmaking methods that abstract 
away from the central values in contention. Theories that do not 
seek to intervene in such conflicts—ones that address, say, an 
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overlooked body of doctrine—are less likely to face critical audi-
ences that demand adulteration or to feel the same need to ap-
pease such critics. For the historically contingent reason given 
above, this suggests that private law theories may be less likely 
to experience the life cycle; the balance of highly politicized legal 
conflicts occur today in public law.28 
At least three types of prescriptive legal theories that do in-
tervene in politically contentious legal conflicts may also depart 
from our paradigm and avoid the life cycle. First, some may en-
dorse decision procedures that are so fluid or underspecified that 
partisans cannot tell which values or interests their adoption 
would ultimately favor, disfavor, or displace. Examples here 
might include theories of experimentalism in public administra-
tion29 and theories of pluralism or multiple modalities in consti-
tutional interpretation.30 A theory that is highly open-ended at 
the outset—agnostic on key questions of procedure as well as sub-
stance—will have few, if any, foundational goals to be compro-
mised. It is impure by design. 
Second, other theories may engage with a political conflict in 
a direct and substantive manner, rather than in an abstract, pro-
cedural register. In consequence, they may escape the critique 
that they have ignored the values most salient to the conflict, as 
well as the obligation to seek consensus validation. Examples 
here might include Professor Robin West’s theory of progressive 
constitutionalism and Professor Randy Barnett’s and Professor 
Richard Epstein’s theories of libertarian constitutionalism, each 
of which is grounded in contested normative commitments.31 
 
 28 See note 27 and accompanying text. 
 29 See generally, for example, Charles F. Sabel and William H. Simon, Minimalism 
and Experimentalism in the Administrative State, 100 Georgetown L J 53 (2011); James 
S. Liebman and Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined: The 
Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 NYU Rev L & Soc Change 
183 (2003). 
 30 See generally, for example, Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Con-
stitution (Oxford 1982); Stephen M. Griffin, Pluralism in Constitutional Interpretation, 72 
Tex L Rev 1753 (1994); Richard H. Fallon Jr, A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Consti-
tutional Interpretation, 100 Harv L Rev 1189 (1987). 
 31 See generally Robin West, Progressive Constitutionalism: Reconstructing the 
Fourteenth Amendment (Duke 1994); Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: 
The Presumption of Liberty (Princeton 2004); Richard A. Epstein, The Classical Liberal 
Constitution: The Uncertain Quest for Limited Government (Harvard 2014). 
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These openly ideological arguments will face other, potentially se-
vere, challenges in the marketplace of legal ideas, but impurifica-
tion is less likely to be one of them. 
And third, a prescriptive legal theory that fails to gain an 
early base of support will not be perceived as a threat by key par-
ticipants in any conflict. Its purity will be maintained at the ex-
pense of marginalization. Examples here are endless. The vast 
majority of proposed legal theories never leave the realm of the 
obscure. 
All that we have said so far concerns prescriptive legal theo-
ries; what of their descriptive counterparts? To the extent that 
any legal theory can be considered purely descriptive,32 we sus-
pect that it will prove relatively impervious to the life cycle. Be-
cause such a theory will not seek to dictate particular legal out-
comes, it will have less of a need to expand its constituency and 
will be less likely to receive pushback from the many parties op-
posed to those outcomes. In the absence of such wide-ranging re-
sistance, a descriptive theory could avoid significant impurifica-
tion and still survive (although, like all theories, it might undergo 
a certain amount of transformation in response to critique). And 
while a descriptive legal theory, like any theory, needs commen-
tators to affirm its worth, a prescriptive theory will generally 
need more, and more influential, supporters to bring about a de-
sired change in the law. In pursuit of these supporters, conces-
sions must be made, adulterations admitted. 
That being said, our model is open to the possibility that the 
descriptive/prescriptive distinction is better conceived of as a 
spectrum than as a hard-and-fast dichotomy. Many positive theo-
rists have prescriptive motivations. Many descriptive theories en-
tail, or may be seen as entailing, certain sorts of legal outcomes 
that are subsequently “exposed” and critiqued on moral or policy 
grounds. Law and economics is perhaps the most significant ex-
ample of an ostensibly descriptive theory of law (at least as clas-
sically formulated) that has been understood by both proponents 
 
 32 See Jack Goldsmith and Adrian Vermeule, Empirical Methodology and Legal 
Scholarship, 69 U Chi L Rev 153, 155 (2002) (arguing that legal scholarship characteris-
tically melds “[d]octrinal, interpretive, and normative” elements and primarily “seeks to 
persuade”); Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 Mich L 
Rev 1835, 1847 (1988) (arguing that the distinguishing “feature of standard legal scholar-
ship is its prescriptive voice, its consciously declared desire to improve the performance of 
legal decisionmakers”). 
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and opponents to have a normative thrust.33 In such cases, de-
scriptive theories may experience life cycle effects—as indeed has 
happened with law and economics.34 In general, susceptibility to 
the life cycle turns on whether a given theory is widely perceived 
as likely to influence, and not just diagnose, official legal practice 
through the introduction of a depoliticized decision procedure.35 
C. An Adulterated Theory or Multiple Theories? 
This Article treats as single objects of analysis legal “theo-
ries” the contents of which are, at this writing, highly contested. 
Would it not be more appropriate to treat theoretical terms such 
as originalism or textualism as names designating sets of legal 
theories that share a family resemblance, but not necessarily a 
common life cycle? This question has more than semantic signifi-
cance, as our own theory contends that the very capaciousness of 
originalism and textualism is attributable to a process of adulter-
ation rather than elective affinity. 
Nonetheless, we think that the question has two relatively 
simple empirical answers. First, theories and theoretical terms 
have origins. And at its origin, as Part III.A discusses, “original-
ism” meant something fairly specific to its supporters and critics. 
To be sure, individual supporters and critics disagreed with each 
 
 33 See, for example, Duncan Kennedy, Law-and-Economics from the Perspective of 
Critical Legal Studies, in Peter Newman, ed, 2 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 
and the Law 465, 471 (Macmillan 1998) (describing increasingly bipartisan efforts to bend 
“the apparently value neutral, technocratic discourse of efficiency” invoked by law and 
economics toward preexisting political ends); Michael W. McConnell, The Counter-Revolution 
in Legal Thought, 41 Pol Rev 18, 23–24 (1987) (arguing that while law and economics “has 
no overt ideological element,” “law and economics scholars will—with only rare exceptions—
take positions compatible with libertarian conservatives”). 
 34 We will soon turn to the specific life cycle of CBA, a prescriptive public law theory 
with roots in law and economics. See Part III.D. As that story suggests, the law and eco-
nomics movement’s original focus on maximizing efficiency or wealth, as well as its asso-
ciation with deregulation and conservative politics, has yielded over time to much more 
complex formulations. For some early efforts to move law and economics in a liberal direc-
tion, see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Progressive Law and Economics—and the New Adminis-
trative Law, 98 Yale L J 341, 341 (1988) (advocating “the development of a reformist law 
and economics”); Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Cri-
tique, 33 Stan L Rev 387, 387 n 1 (1981) (collecting sources from “the ‘liberal’ law and 
economics school”). 
 35 Accordingly, our own life cycle model—if it were to become popular and perceived 
as likely to influence legal practice—would also be susceptible to impurification through 
exceptions and modifications that come to blunt whatever prescriptive force it was initially 
thought to possess. 
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other on numerous levels. But even to have these debates re-
quired the existence of some minimal consensus view of the 
emerging theory: an understanding of its basic assumptions, pre-
scriptions, and goals that few participants would have disputed. 
This consensus is a social and historical fact about the legal com-
munity at a particular moment in time. It is precisely because of 
the intellectual and political setbacks and successes experienced 
by this original “originalism” that the term—and the theoretical 
school that embraced it—gradually became more complex, capa-
cious, and even at times self-contradictory. 
Second, however diverse a given theoretical school may be-
come and however disparate the motivations of those operating 
within it may be, members of the theoretical school generally re-
main committed to the theory’s initial decisional formalism. 
Originalists do not abandon the decisional centrality of the con-
stitutional text; textualists do not abandon the decisional central-
ity of the statutory text; cost-benefit analysts do not abandon the 
decisional centrality of a calculus of trade-offs; and popular con-
stitutionalists do not abandon the decisional centrality of “the 
people,” even as they locate “the people” in more rarified institu-
tional settings. This fixation on a theory’s initial formalism, de-
spite increasingly significant intellectual and political differences 
among its proponents, belies an account of family resemblance or 
elective affinity.36 This fixation strikes us, instead, as strong evi-
dence of the adulteration of a common source—which is to say, 
strong evidence of life cycle effects. 
We should note that in assessing the development of these 
theoretical schools, our method is to examine the claims made in 
a theory’s name not only by law professors but also by government 
officials, public intellectuals, and movement activists. Such a 
broad description of a theory’s social base is open to the objection 
that it stacks the deck in favor of a finding of adulteration. For 
instance, by sharply distinguishing academic from judicial and 
popular invocations of a theory, one might be able to redescribe 
internal diversity and discord as the existence of multiple, rela-
tively harmonious theoretical schools. 
 
 36 This fixation on a theory’s initial formalism may also help to explain the persis-
tence of a theory long after its other initial assumptions and prescriptions have been aban-
doned and no longer constitute part of the consensus view of the theory. See Part V.B. 
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This objection strikes us as misplaced. Even within the con-
fines of the academy, all of the theories under discussion have be-
come highly adulterated.37 Furthermore, any effort to segregate 
academic from nonacademic invocations of a given theory would 
be in considerable tension with the structure of prescriptive legal 
theorizing. Such theorizing necessarily seeks, at some level, to at-
tract nonacademic adherents: government officials in particular, 
as well as those who have the power to influence those officials. 
To restrict the inquiry to any single discursive community would 
be to miss the interpenetration of scholarly, governmental, and 
popular discourses that drives the development of these theories. 
II.  THE STRUCTURE OF THE LIFE CYCLE 
We now turn to the life cycle itself. It bears emphasis at the 
outset that our model is the product of an induction over a limited 
number of cases: those theories that have achieved widespread 
popularity in American public law during the past several decades. 
We do not claim to have identified any precise metric for assessing 
a theory’s popularity or “impurity,” much less any transcendent 
truth about law. Nevertheless, given the significance of the exam-
ples we have included and the historical trend they appear to rep-
resent, we feel reasonably confident that our model has predictive 
as well as descriptive power. At least for the foreseeable future, 
any process-oriented public law theory that attracts extensive 
support can be expected to arrive at a state of impurity. This Part 
elaborates on the stages of the life cycle, including the drivers and 
dynamics of the impurification process. 
A. Stage One: Theory Birth 
At T1, the theory introduces a decision procedure or criterion 
for judgment that seeks to resolve a highly politicized legal 
conflict in terms that are relatively alien to the main points 
 
 37 One could argue, of course, that what we call “adulteration” within the academy is 
better explained as the splintering of one theory into multiple theories, even in cases in 
which all of the relevant academics claim to adhere to a single theory. In this vein, some 
self-proclaimed originalists contend that other self-proclaimed originalists are not truly 
originalists. This kind of argument, although often couched in descriptive terms, is really 
an argument about which rules an originalist ought to follow or promote. The best a de-
scriptive (meta-)theory such as ours can do is to acknowledge and assess this disagreement 
from an external perspective. For our purposes at least, any effort to reinterpret the 
disagreement in terms of the existence of multiple, internally consistent prescriptive legal 
theories would produce a less accurate description of the theoretical field. 
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of political contention; in so doing, the theory differentiates 
itself from preexisting legal theories used to negotiate the 
conflict. 
As noted above, the theories we see as most prone to the life 
cycle arise out of specific sociolegal conflicts. These conflicts are 
about legal questions, such as the best way for judges to interpret 
the Constitution or for administrators to implement statutes, but 
they have clear political stakes and identifiable political blocs. 
When originalism emerged as a theory of constitutional interpre-
tation, for instance, it was widely understood to reflect “conserva-
tive frustration with the broad, rights-expansive decisions of the 
Warren and Burger Courts” in areas such as criminal procedure 
and reproductive choice.38 When popular constitutionalism 
emerged some two decades later, it was widely understood to re-
flect liberal frustration with the broad, rights-constrictive deci-
sions of the Rehnquist Court in areas such as antidiscrimination 
law.39 The market for a new prescriptive legal theory begins to 
expand as the leading theories of the day come to be seen either 
as partial to one side of the conflict or as unresponsive to both 
sides—as doing too much political work or too little. By the time 
originalism arrived on the scene in the 1970s, “fundamental val-
ues” and other explicitly moral theories of constitutional interpreta-
tion had become associated with liberal and Democratic projects,40 
 
 38 Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 Georgetown L J 713, 
716 (2011). See also, for example, Robert Post and Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political 
Practice: The Right’s Living Constitution, 75 Fordham L Rev 545, 554–55 (2006) (“No po-
litically literate person could miss the point that the Reagan Administration’s use of 
originalism marked, and was meant to mark, a set of distinctively conservative objections 
to the liberal precedents of the Warren Court.”); Keith E. Whittington, The New Original-
ism, 2 Georgetown J L & Pub Pol 599, 601 (2004) (“[O]riginalism was a reactive theory 
motivated by substantive disagreement with the recent and then-current actions of the 
Warren and Burger Courts; originalism was largely developed as a mode of criticism of 
those actions.”). 
 39 See, for example, Jamal Greene, Book Review, Giving the Constitution to the 
Courts, 117 Yale L J 886, 918 (2008) (“Just as many conservatives sought refuge from the 
individual rights decisions of the Warren and Burger Courts in a jurisprudence of original 
intent, some liberal academics have sought to rebut the Rehnquist Court’s structural cri-
tique by resort to popular constitutionalism in all its sundry guises.”). 
 40 See Johnathan G. O’Neill, Raoul Berger and the Restoration of Originalism, 96 Nw 
U L Rev 253, 268–69 (2001) (discussing Professor Raoul Berger’s critique of the “fundamental 
values” approach favored by “legal liberals”); Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/ 
Constitutional Law, 99 Yale L J 453, 544 (1989) (noting “the familiar view of [Griswold v 
Connecticut] as a paradigmatic example of an ‘activist’ Court seeking to keep the living 
constitution up to date by imposing its own idea of ‘fundamental values’”); Antonin Scalia, 
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U Cin L Rev 849, 863 (1989) (criticizing fundamental 
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whereas prominent alternatives such as structuralism had never 
aligned closely with any ideological camp.41 
Against this backdrop, the new theory introduces an ap-
proach to legal decisionmaking that purports to advance a certain 
high-level end, such as democracy, judicial constraint, or social 
welfare, without committing to any of the political blocs that con-
stitute the poles of the conflict. The theory may be inaugurated 
by one side or the other, as with the conservative push for 
originalism or the liberal push for popular constitutionalism. But 
its prescriptions are held out as uniquely attractive and legiti-
mate regardless of which groups or which values end up winning 
in any given case. While proponents do not necessarily tout the 
theory’s substantive “neutrality”—conventional CBA, for exam-
ple, was openly oriented around the pursuit of economic effi-
ciency42—they do claim a kind of relative neutrality. They promise 
an approach that allows official decisionmakers to avoid choosing 
directly among the competing political blocs and their first-order 
preferences. People of all stripes, it is claimed, should be willing 
to accept the theory in principle. 
The precise date of birth for these theories can be difficult to 
pinpoint. The theory may be introduced (or reintroduced in mod-
ern form) in a foundational work or set of works, on which sym-
pathetic commentators seek to build: Judge Robert Bork’s 1971 
article Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems43 
and Professor Raoul Berger’s 1977 book Government by Judiciary44 
are often said to have played this role in the case of originalism, 
 
values and related theories as an invitation to “judicial personalization of the law” and 
contending that “[m]ost if not all” such theorists “would strike down the death penalty”). 
 41 See Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Collectivism and Ex-offender Residence Ex-
clusion Laws, 92 Iowa L Rev 1, 30 n 210 (2006) (noting that structuralism of the sort theo-
rized by Professor Charles Black “has been a staple in conservative and liberal commen-
tary and judicial opinions alike”). See also generally Charles L. Black Jr, Structure and 
Relationship in Constitutional Law 3–32 (Louisiana State 1969). 
 42 See, for example, Sidney A. Shapiro and Christopher H. Schroeder, Beyond Cost-
Benefit Analysis: A Pragmatic Reorientation, 32 Harv Envir L Rev 433, 446–50 (2008) (ob-
serving that the adoption of CBA in the 1980s and in earlier periods was justified as a 
means “to promote economic efficiency”); Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, Rethinking 
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 Yale L J 165, 186 (1999) (“The purpose of CBA, as typically 
understood, is to separate out the distributional issue and isolate the efficiency issue, so 
that the agency will evaluate projects solely on the basis of their efficiency.”). 
 43 See generally Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment 
Problems, 47 Ind L J 1 (1971). 
 44 See generally Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment (Harvard 1977). 
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which crystallized as a distinctive interpretive approach in the 
1980s.45 Alternatively, the theory may be propounded in a range 
of contemporaneous works, leaving its pedigree more obscure. 
Among those who help to launch a prescriptive legal theory, some 
may be motivated by broad moral goals, some by narrow policy 
goals, some by professional advancement or personal renown, 
some by intellectual curiosity, some by the pursuit of truth, and 
some by a complicated mix of each of these factors and perhaps 
others as well. It may be the case that legal commentators face 
especially strong incentives to offer ambitious new theories, 
which will then have to be scaled back, on account of the prefer-
ences of law review editors or the dynamics of legal intellectual 
influence.46 But we need not delve too deeply into the determi-
nants of legal theory entrepreneurship, as our focus is on aggre-
gate sociological effects rather than individual behaviors. No mat-
ter what accounts for their genesis, all theories with the formal 
features we identify are susceptible to the life cycle. Once such a 
theory is born, its parents cannot control its ultimate life path. 
B. Stages Two through Five: The Dialectic of Impurification 
At T2, critics of the theory highlight its failure to secure cer-
tain values that gave rise to the conflict in the first place. 
At T3, the theory responds to these critiques by internalizing 
them—supplementing or modifying its approach so as to bet-
ter serve the initially ignored values. As a result, the theory’s 
constituency expands, but at the price of normative and con-
ceptual purity. 
At T4, this process of criticism and response recurs. 
At T5, the theory has come to reflect the conflict-ridden polit-
ical and theoretical field it had promised to transcend. To the 
extent the theory ever posed a direct threat to particular par-
ticipants in the underlying conflict, that danger has dwindled. 
 
 45 See Lee J. Strang, Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism?: Theoretical Possi-
bilities and Practical Differences, 87 Notre Dame L Rev 253, 267 n 78 (2011) (“[O]riginal-
ism’s modern incarnation beg[an] in the 1970s, with the publication of [Bork’s article and 
Berger’s book].”). Another work cited in this vein is William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of 
a Living Constitution, 54 Tex L Rev 693 (1976). As these examples reflect, the theoretical 
turn toward legal process that we have associated with the 1980s, see Part I.A, had some 
important antecedents in the 1970s. 
 46 This Article certainly does not dispel the possibility. 
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Most theories that are introduced each year go nowhere. 
Even if they manage to attract attention, they fail to spark follow-
on inquiry, much less develop into a recognizable school of 
thought.47 The question of why certain legal theories develop into 
intellectual and social movements is highly contextual and 
largely beyond the scope of this study.48 The one point we wish to 
raise in this regard is that, in the current legal process–inflected 
era, those prescriptive theories that lack an abstract, procedural 
orientation start with a competitive disadvantage.49 The suscepti-
bility of a theory to the life cycle, that is, may be not only a product 
of its success in gaining a wide range of adherents but also a 
condition precedent for achieving such success in the first place.50 
Whatever propels them forward, some prescriptive theories 
of the sort we describe do blossom into intellectual movements. 
And when this happens, impurification follows. Through an iter-
ative process of contestation and reformulation, the theories be-
come increasingly unmoored from the goals that were articulated 
to justify their adoption, adrift from their raisons d’être. The de-
tails of this evolutionary process are also highly contextual, to be 
sure, but the process itself is not so complex or contingent as to 
preclude a stylized model. The key development occurs at T3 (and 
may recur numerous times thereafter), when normative objec-
tions to the theory are not simply parried by those speaking in the 
name of the theory but rather are incorporated into the theory 
itself, through refinements designed to address the objections. 
This is the moment, to put it provocatively, when the theory be-
gins to cannibalize itself. 
Why and how do these self-defeating shifts occur? In a typical 
case, several mechanisms combine to produce the phenomenon. 
Some of these mechanisms may affect individual theorists who 
 
 47 See Thomas A. Smith, The Web of Law, 44 San Diego L Rev 309, 336 (2007) (re-
porting that “[f]orty-three percent of [law review] articles are not cited at all, and about 
79% get ten or fewer citations”). 
 48 For an analysis of the conditions under which “scientific/intellectual movements” 
are most likely to emerge and succeed, see generally Scott Frickel and Neil Gross, A Gen-
eral Theory of Scientific/Intellectual Movements, 70 Am Sociological Rev 204 (2005). 
 49 See Part I.A. In light of the greater political salience of public law disputes, see 
notes 27–28 and accompanying text, we think this point holds especially true in public law 
fields. 
 50 See Jamal Greene, How Constitutional Theory Matters, 72 Ohio St L J 1183, 1199 
(2011) (“A protean disposition is necessary for a [constitutional] methodology to success-
fully validate a diverse set of political objectives with equilibria in both our past and our 
future.”). 
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modify their views over time, while others rely on an influx of new 
commentators who continually criticize and revise the theory. 
Key impurifying agents include:51 
Political feedback effects. As the new theory encounters criti-
cism about morally relevant information that it excludes or about 
substantive values and social groups that it disfavors, notwith-
standing its ostensibly depoliticized character, proponents may 
suggest revisions intended to broaden or maintain the theory’s 
appeal. Early versions of originalism that seemed hard to recon-
cile with Brown v Board of Education of Topeka,52 for example, 
were jettisoned in part to “make originalism safe for Brown” and 
the principle of racial equality that the canonical case embodies.53 
The theory of originalism thereafter became harder to typecast as 
radical or right leaning in its methodological demands and policy 
implications. 
Professional feedback effects. While impurification is partly 
driven by the need to incorporate discordant political views, it also 
follows from epistemic and practical weaknesses of the theory that 
only become apparent over time. As the new theory encounters 
criticism about such weaknesses, proponents may suggest revi-
sions intended to make the initial idea not just more politically 
palatable but also more intellectually and institutionally sound 
or a better fit with prevailing legal norms, in ways that redound 
to their reputational benefit and attract partisans of alternative 
theoretical approaches. The theory becomes more sophisticated 
and less grandiose.54 Early versions of originalism that relied on 
idiosyncratic notions of the Framers’ intent, for example, were jet-
tisoned in part to make the theory more coherent, if less con-
straining.55 What we are calling a process of impurification can 
thus be seen as a process of purification from another perspective: 
the very moves that undermine the theory’s initial normative as-
pirations may be ones that make it conceptually richer and more 
refined. 
 
 51 For a discussion of additional adaptive behaviors that facilitate the life cycle, see 
text accompanying notes 215–19. 
 52 347 US 483 (1954). 
 53 Jed Rubenfeld, Reply to Commentators, 115 Yale L J 2093, 2098 (2006). 
 54 See Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays 3–4 (Basic 
Books 1973) (observing that certain ideas that seem to “resolve [ ] many fundamental prob-
lems at once” periodically “burst upon the intellectual landscape with a tremendous force” 
and then, with the exception of “zealots,” commentators “settle down after a while to the 
problems the idea has really generated”). 
 55 See Part III.A. 
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Fragmentation and co-optation. As the new theory is elabo-
rated by more and more commentators, differences of opinion may 
emerge and eventually crystallize into competing versions of the 
theory, further compromising the objectives of its founders. Some 
of the second- and third-generation commentators who speak in 
the theory’s name may not share those objectives at all, and may 
even wish to subvert them. Originalism, as Professor James 
Fleming observes, has now experienced both balkanization into 
rival camps and Balkinization, or “what happens when original-
ism becomes so inclusive that even Yale law professor Jack Balkin, 
hitherto a pragmatic living constitutionalist, becomes an 
originalist.”56 
Churches can excommunicate those who peddle false ver-
sions of their creed. Political parties may be able to withhold en-
dorsements and financial support from those who defy the party 
line. Intellectual movements have no comparable tools to weed 
out saboteurs from sympathizers or to ensure internal disci-
pline—perhaps especially if they are led by professors whose com-
pensation derives largely from fixed, school-specific salaries (as in 
law) rather than competitive, centralized grants. As a prescrip-
tive legal theory becomes increasingly influential, the universe of 
people who identify with the theory not only expands in size but 
also changes in composition, becoming more ideologically diverse 
and representative of the overall population of lawyers. Purists 
are absorbed into the crowd. 
C. Stage Six: Theory Death and Theory Persistence 
At T6, the theory either falls out of favor with mainstream 
legal actors, at least for the time being, or persists in sub-
stantially adulterated form. 
The life cycle reaches its end once a prescriptive legal theory, 
as expressed by prominent commentators and applied by public 
officials, becomes incapable of fulfilling the distinctive normative 
functions—including decisional clarity—it was created to fulfill. 
But life and law go on. One of two basic fates awaits a theory at T6. 
The first is theory death. Legal thinkers and decisionmakers 
may gradually set aside an adulterated theory as a needless com-
plication or obfuscation of the initial conflict, until at some point 
 
 56 James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution: For Moral Readings and 
against Originalisms 2 (Oxford 2015). 
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the theory ceases to claim new adherents. Such a slide toward 
irrelevance seems to be happening at this moment to popular con-
stitutionalism.57 Although the impurification process we describe 
may have a dialectical cast, it does not necessarily yield durable 
syntheses.58 
Importantly, however, abandonment of a theory may be only 
temporary. Today’s originalism is the successor to last genera-
tion’s “interpretivism.”59 Today’s CBA is the latest successor to 
versions of CBA dating back to the New Deal era.60 Both theories 
have older intellectual roots. A prescriptive legal theory may fade 
away at T6 only to be reborn, years later, in a slightly revised and 
relabeled form.61 And then the impurification process starts again. 
Our life cycle theory is thus consonant with a larger epicyclical ac-
count of legal theory development. 
The second fate is that of stubborn persistence. Even if it no 
longer serves its motivating purposes, an adulterated theory may 
continue to command allegiance because it serves social interests 
that are unrelated to those purposes. There are many reasons, for 
instance, why contemporary left liberals may wish to associate 
themselves with originalism and CBA, as we explore in Part V. 
 
 57 See Helen J. Knowles and Julianne A. Toia, Defining “Popular Constitutionalism”: 
The Kramer versus Kramer Problem, 42 S U L Rev 31, 55–56 (2014) (finding that usage of 
the term “popular constitutionalism” in law journals has dropped precipitously over the 
past five to ten years). We will have more to say about popular constitutionalism’s decline 
in Parts III.C and V.B. 
 58 For this reason, among others, we do not find it useful to draw on a formal theory 
of dialectics, whether Hegelian or Marxist. We do note an affinity between our model and 
the dialectical vision of Professors Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, insofar as their 
vision suggests that assertions of rational progress have a built-in tendency to revert to 
struggles over power. See generally Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of 
Enlightenment (Continuum 2d ed 1988) (John Cumming, trans). Here too, though, the 
connection is so tenuous that it does not seem worth developing. 
 59 See Dennis J. Goldford, The American Constitution and the Debate over Original-
ism 90–121 (Cambridge 2005) (describing “the evolution of the interpretivism debate into 
the originalism debate”). 
 60 See Daniel H. Cole, Law, Politics, and Cost–Benefit Analysis, 64 Ala L Rev 55, 56 
(2012) (“Formal CBA has been around since the New Deal when President Roosevelt’s 
National Planning Board . . . began commissioning economic analyses of public works 
projects.”). 
 61 Such revising and relabeling of faded theories need not be self-conscious and, on 
the contrary, may be facilitated by lack of familiarity with prior scholarship. See, for ex-
ample, Mark Tushnet, Harry Kalven and Kenneth Karst in The Supreme Court Review: 
Reflections after Fifty Years, 2010 S Ct Rev 35, 35 (suggesting that many of “the questions 
that [constitutional] scholars today regard as deep were already present, though some-
times submerged, in [ ] articles” published fifty years ago). 
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But those reasons have little to do with disciplining judges or ad-
ministrators or with maximizing economic efficiency or fidelity to 
the constitutional text. 
III.  CASE STUDIES 
Having laid out the general framework of our model, we now 
turn to case studies to help illustrate its workings. This Part re-
views the intellectual history of several prominent legal theories 
through the lens of the life cycle. As suggested above, there is a 
conventional narrative regarding when theories such as original-
ism and textualism emerged and what they were “about” during 
this formative period. We sketch these origin stories, which estab-
lish a baseline for understanding what the theories were meant 
to accomplish, and then trace the theories’ development in the 
years that followed. These case studies proceed in a necessarily 
summary fashion; a detailed version of any one of them would be 
an article unto itself. Nevertheless, we believe that the discus-
sions below (and the more exhaustive historical treatments on 
which some of them draw) are sufficient to demonstrate that the 
life cycle model plausibly fits the evidence—that it provides a par-
simonious and consilient account not only of why these theories 
have evolved in the manner that they have, but also of how these 
seemingly disparate episodes in public law reform are in fact 
closely connected.62 
 
 62 We focus on four episodes that strike us as particularly important and revealing, 
but the life cycle model might be applied to numerous other theories as well. We suspect, 
for example, that judicial minimalism of the sort advocated by Professor Cass Sunstein, 
see generally Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme 
Court (Harvard 1999), experienced impurification as theorists following Sunstein sought 
to characterize various exercises of judicial power either as legitimate exceptions to mini-
malism or (more commonly) as appropriate applications of minimalism, properly under-
stood. See Michael S. Greve, Atlas Croaks. Supreme Court Shrugs., 6 Charleston L Rev 15, 
32 n 79 (2011) (complaining that “judicial minimalism in theory means maximalism in 
fact”). Looking ahead, Sunstein’s influential theory of “nudging,” see generally Richard H. 
Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Hap-
piness (Yale 2008), may be an interesting candidate for impurification. If the prescribed 
nudging strategies become increasingly transparent and private choice respecting (and 
thus politically popular) in response to criticisms of excessive paternalism and manipula-
tion, they may also become increasingly ineffective at pushing people toward regulators’ 
desired outcomes. Outside of law, Danaher has suggested that the theory of effective al-
truism fits our model. See generally Danaher, The Life Cycle of Prescriptive (Legal) Theo-
ries (cited in note 8). 
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A. From Old Originalism to New Originalism 
The story of originalism’s theoretical evolution has been told 
numerous times in recent years,63 so we will aim to be as concise 
as possible here. As already indicated, contemporary originalist 
theory arose out of conservative frustration with the “activist” 
constitutional rulings of the Warren and Burger Courts;64 re-
ceived influential articulations in the 1970s from Professor Berger, 
Judge Bork, and then–Associate Justice William Rehnquist;65 and 
rose to public prominence in the mid-1980s following the advocacy 
of Attorney General Edwin Meese.66 In these early years, original-
ists urged a “jurisprudence of original intention,”67 according to 
which judges would be required to follow “the specific intentions 
of the Framers . . . regarding how a specific provision was meant 
to apply to specific issues.”68 This methodology was defended on 
 
 63 Useful histories of contemporary originalist theory include Johnathan O’Neill, 
Originalism in American Law and Politics: A Constitutional History 111–216 (Johns Hopkins 
2005), Colby, 99 Georgetown L J at 716–36 (cited in note 38), Lawrence B. Solum, What Is 
Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist Theory, in Grant Huscroft and 
Bradley W. Miller, eds, The Challenge of Originalism: Theories of Constitutional Interpre-
tation 12, 13–27 (Cambridge 2011), Thomas B. Colby and Peter J. Smith, Living Original-
ism, 59 Duke L J 239, 247–62 (2009), and Vasan Kesavan and Michael Stokes Paulsen, 
The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 Georgetown L J 
1113, 1134–48 (2003). But see Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Con-
struction, 82 Fordham L Rev 453, 462 (2013) (“A comprehensive history of originalist theo-
rizing has yet to be written.”). Professor Lawrence Solum has recently begun to sketch a 
revisionist account of originalism’s history, according to which originalism emerged as a 
coherent theory of constitutional interpretation only in the 1980s and thenceforth evolved 
from an inchoate and indeterminate “mélange” of ideas into an increasingly consistent 
view. Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original 
Meaning, 91 Notre Dame L Rev 1, 4 (2015). This Article relies largely on the standard 
story of originalism’s development. While Solum’s revisionist account may call into ques-
tion aspects of this story with regard to a specialized scholarly literature, we continue to 
believe that the story well captures the trajectory of originalism in academic, judicial, and 
popular commentary more broadly. See Part I.C (defending our decision to consider non-
academic as well as academic invocations of a theory). 
 64 See note 38 and accompanying text. 
 65 See notes 43–45 and accompanying text. 
 66 See O’Neill, Originalism in American Law and Politics at 146–60 (cited in note 63); 
Steven M. Teles, Transformative Bureaucracy: Reagan’s Lawyers and the Dynamics of Po-
litical Investment, 23 Stud Am Polit Dev 61, 75–82 (2009). 
 67 This was the famous phrase used in Meese’s first originalism speech. See Edwin 
Meese III, Speech before the American Bar Association, in Steven G. Calabresi, ed, 
Originalism: A Quarter-Century of Debate 47, 50–54 (Regnery 2007). 
 68 Kesavan and Paulsen, 91 Georgetown L J at 1135 (cited in note 63). “[E]xtrapola-
tions from that intention” could be used when dealing with “modern issues not within the 
specific contemplation of the Framers or the Ratifiers.” Id. 
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democratic and rule of law grounds. But the “primary commit-
ment” of originalist theory in the 1970s and 1980s, as many have 
observed, “was to judicial restraint.”69 Constraining judges 
through text and history was held out to be the theory’s central 
virtue and objective. “Originalist methods of constitutional inter-
pretation were understood as a means to that end.”70 
Original intent originalism met with a variety of objections. 
One line of critique called attention to the difficulties of recover-
ing and applying the Framers’ (possibly quite varied) intentions.71 
Another line of critique claimed that the Framers did not intend 
for their own subjective intentions to be controlling.72 A third line 
of critique emphasized that a jurisprudence of original intent 
might be at odds with celebrated decisions such as Brown, as 
some of originalism’s early proponents had openly acknowledged.73 
In response to these objections, originalism underwent a se-
ries of transformations. The focus of inquiry moved from the in-
tentions of the Framers to the understandings of the ratifiers to 
the “original public meaning” of the constitutional text, or how 
the words of the Constitution “would have been understood by an 
ordinary, reasonably well-informed user of the language, in con-
text, at the time, within the relevant political community that 
adopted them.”74 Justice Antonin Scalia helped catalyze this move 
in a 1986 speech that called on originalists “to change the label 
from the Doctrine of Original Intent to the Doctrine of Original 
 
 69 Whittington, 2 Georgetown J L & Pub Pol at 602 (cited in note 38). See also, for 
example, Colby, 99 Georgetown L J at 717 (cited in note 38) (“It would be difficult to over-
state the extent to which the Old Originalism was characterized by its own proponents as 
a theory that could constrain judges.”); Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided”: 
Lochner and Constitutional Historicism, 85 BU L Rev 677, 690 (2005) (“The old original-
ism was designed to promote judicial restraint and criticize the judicial innovations of 
liberal judges.”). 
 70 Whittington, 2 Georgetown J L & Pub Pol at 602 (cited in note 38). 
 71 See, for example, Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understand-
ing, 60 BU L Rev 204, 209–22 (1980). A parallel line of critique emphasized that it was the 
Constitution’s manifold ratifiers, not the forty-odd delegates in Philadelphia, who con-
ferred legal and democratic legitimacy on the document. Id at 214–15. 
 72 See generally H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 
98 Harv L Rev 885 (1985). 
 73 See, for example, Berger, Government by Judiciary at 117–33 (cited in note 44); 
Earl Maltz, Some New Thoughts on an Old Problem—the Role of the Intent of the Framers 
in Constitutional Theory, 63 BU L Rev 811, 846–50 (1983). 
 74 Kesavan and Paulsen, 91 Georgetown L J at 1144–45 (cited in note 63) (citation 
omitted). 
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Meaning.”75 In addition to the turn to public meaning, originalists 
generally came to embrace a distinction between “constitutional 
interpretation” (understood as the effort to discern the text’s com-
municative content) and “constitutional construction” (under-
stood as the process by which that text is given legal effect).76 In 
the many instances in which the communicative content of the 
constitutional text does not fully determine a legal result, these 
originalists allow, a judge must engage in the “essentially norma-
tive” practice of construction.77 As a result of these and related 
shifts, the so-called new originalism that predominates today is 
conceptually sophisticated, richly elaborated, and substan-
tially immune from the sharpest objections leveled against its 
predecessors. 
It is also highly impure, in the sense we use that term. As 
Professor Thomas Colby has explained at length, the theoretical 
adjustments that have enhanced originalism’s academic credibil-
ity and broadened its political appeal have “effectively sacrificed 
the Old Originalism’s promise of judicial constraint.”78 The same 
developments credited with helping originalism “work itself 
pure”79 in a scholastic sense, that is, have compromised its foun-
dational (and still often touted80) aim to limit judicial discretion 
and bring clarity and predictability to constitutional law. A num-
ber of internal schisms have opened up along the way, as some 
self-identified originalists seek to justify and facilitate its conver-
gence with living constitutionalism,81 some seek to recast the theory 
 
 75 Antonin Scalia, Address by Justice Antonin Scalia before the Attorney General’s 
Conference on Economic Liberties in Washington, D.C. (June 14, 1986), in Original Mean-
ing Jurisprudence: A Sourcebook 101, 106 (Office of Legal Policy 1987). 
 76 See Solum, 82 Fordham L Rev at 458–75 (cited in note 63) (explicating the 
interpretation/construction distinction and its role in “the New Originalism”). 
 77 Id at 472. For a suggestion that the interpretation/construction distinction col-
lapses, see Frederick Schauer, Is Law a Technical Language?, 52 San Diego L Rev 501, 
511–12 (2015). 
 78 Colby, 99 Georgetown L J at 714 (cited in note 38). See also D.A. Jeremy Telman, 
Originalism: A Thing Worth Doing . . ., 42 Ohio N U L Rev 529, 543 (2016) (“Originalism 
now enacts judicial activism rather than resisting it.”). 
 79 Kesavan and Paulsen, 91 Georgetown L J at 1127, 1133 (cited in note 63). See also 
Lee J. Strang, Originalism’s Promise, and Its Limits, 63 Cleve St L Rev 81, 84 (2014) (ex-
plaining that originalism has evolved to “meet[ ] the various criticisms that have been 
leveled against it” and thereby made itself “better”). 
 80 See Eric Berger, Originalism’s Pretenses, 16 U Pa J Const L 329, 330 (2013) (noting 
that while “originalism has changed many times,” proponents continue to “tout[ ] its abil-
ity to constrain judges”). 
 81 See generally, for example, Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism (Belknap 2011); 
Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 Stan L Rev 551 (2006). 
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in less normative and more positivistic terms,82 and some seek to 
fend off the foregoing efforts—and save originalism’s “soul”83—
through additional methodological modifications84 or a return to 
“[o]ld-time”85 ideas such as intentionalism. 
Yet while Colby is correct that originalism has “sacrificed” 
some of its original ideals as it has become increasingly refined, 
he errs in assuming that this theoretical trajectory (or this trade-
off) is peculiar to originalism.86 On the contrary, the process of 
adulteration through maturation is endemic to legal theorizing. 
It is the life cycle. The failure to understand originalism’s devel-
opment in this broader context, furthermore, distorts Colby’s 
reading of the evidence that he so sensitively assembles—leading 
him both to overstate the “inconsistency” and “incoherence” of the 
originalist movement,87 and to understate the real-world effects 
that its adulterated products may be having on the legal system.88 
To make headway on the “bedeviling” phenomenon that Colby 
has observed,89 it is necessary to generalize, and theorize, his 
observations. 
 
 82 See generally, for example, William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 Colum 
L Rev 2349 (2015); Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 Harv 
J L & Pub Pol 817 (2015). 
 83 Steven D. Smith, That Old-Time Originalism, in Huscroft and Miller, eds, The 
Challenge of Originalism 223, 230 (cited in note 63). 
 84 See, for example, Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual 
Meaning, Original Intent, and Judicial Review 204–06 (Kansas 1999) (advocating defer-
ence to the political branches on matters of constitutional construction); John O. McGinnis 
and Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation 
and the Case against Construction, 103 Nw U L Rev 751, 752 (2009) (arguing that “the 
Constitution should be interpreted based on the enactors’ original methods” of interpretation). 
 85 Smith, That Old-Time Originalism at 232 (cited in note 83). 
 86 See Colby, 99 Georgetown L J at 714, 776 (cited in note 38) (describing original-
ism’s sacrifice of judicial constraint as an “unheralded,” “ironic,” and “bedeviling” phenomenon). 
 87 Colby and Smith, 59 Duke L J at 249 (cited in note 63). In Colby and his coauthor 
Professor Peter Smith’s telling, originalism is “not a single, coherent, unified theory of 
constitutional interpretation, but rather a smorgasbord of distinct constitutional theories 
that share little in common except a misleading reliance on a single label.” Id at 244. Solum 
has persuasively rebutted this claim and demonstrated that virtually all self-identified 
originalists agree in principle on certain core ideas of “fixation” and “constraint.” See Solum, 
82 Fordham L Rev at 459–62 (cited in note 63). 
 88 Colby provocatively ends his article with the suggestion that “[o]riginalism seems 
to be having its cake and eating it too,” Colby, 99 Georgetown L J at 778 (cited in note 38), 
but he does not explore any specific consequences. For our own thoughts on the causes and 
consequences of originalism’s adulterated persistence, see Part V.B. 
 89 Colby, 99 Georgetown L J at 776 (cited in note 38). 
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B. From New Textualism to New New Textualism 
When the theory of “new textualism” emerged in the 1980s, 
it too promised to discipline judicial behavior—in the realm of 
statutes.90 New textualism took aim at the broadly purposive ap-
proach to statutory interpretation that had come to dominate theory 
and practice in the wake of the New Deal.91 Displacing an earlier 
textualist tradition that sought to locate legislative intent in the 
“plain meaning” of statutes,92 mid-century purposivists urged in-
terpreters to “[c]arry [o]ut the [p]urpose” of statutes as best they 
can, on the assumption “that the legislature was made up of rea-
sonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably.”93 The 
distinguishing features of this purposive approach included the 
extensive use of legislative history and a “soft plain meaning 
rule,” according to which “the plainest meaning [could] be 
trumped by contradictory legislative history.”94 
By the 1980s, however, this approach had led courts into a 
nettle of politically charged debates about the validity of new reg-
ulatory schemes.95 The judges’ “willingness to consider almost any-
thing that was said about or happened to a legislative proposal 
that becomes a statute” only highlighted the political stakes of 
their interpretive methods.96 Drawing on modern public-choice 
 
 90 For a broad overview of the new textualist movement during the 1980s, see gen-
erally William N. Eskridge Jr, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L Rev 621 (1990). See also 
Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 Wash U L Q 
351, 355–57 (1994) (tracking the rise of textualism in the Supreme Court during the 1980s). 
 91 See Caleb Nelson, A Response to Professor Manning, 91 Va L Rev 451, 455 (2005) 
(“[T]extualism arose as a challenge to a reigning ‘orthodoxy’ that dominated American 
jurisprudence after World War II, and that encouraged judges to take a ‘purposivist’ ap-
proach to the interpretation of statutes.”) (citation omitted). 
 92 On the textualism that predominated during the pre–New Deal period, see Nicholas 
R. Parrillo, Leviathan and Interpretive Revolution: The Administrative State, the Judiciary, 
and the Rise of Legislative History, 1890–1950, 123 Yale L J 266, 271–75, 302–06 (2013); 
Harry Willmer Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of 
Federal Statutes, 25 Wash U L Q 2, 5 (1939). 
 93 Henry M. Hart Jr and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the 
Making and Application of Law 1378–80 (Foundation 1994) (William N. Eskridge Jr and 
Philip P. Frickey, eds). 
 94 Eskridge, 37 UCLA L Rev at 626–28 (cited in note 90). On the normalization of 
legislative history as an interpretive tool in the 1940s, see Parrillo, 123 Yale L J at 287–
300 (cited in note 92). 
 95 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice: Managing Social Security Disability 
Claims 1–11 (Yale 1983); Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 
Cal L Rev 1044, 1048–81 (1984). 
 96 Eskridge, 37 UCLA L Rev at 632 (cited in note 90). 
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scholarship as well as a classically formalist conception of the sep-
aration of powers, new textualists attacked the entire enterprise 
of “imaginative[ly] reconstruct[ing]” legislative intent.97 Purposiv-
ism, they argued, underestimated the complexity and opacity of 
the legislative process, overestimated the ability of judges to re-
cover shared aims from biased committee reports and floor de-
bates, and elevated judicial inclinations over the sovereign deci-
sions embodied in legislative enactments.98 The most prominent 
new textualists, such as Scalia and Judge Frank Easterbrook, 
contended that these enactments—the statutory texts them-
selves—provided the sole legitimate source of law.99 “To favor a 
statute’s purposes over its text, they argued, was to ignore the 
constitutionally prescribed lawmaking procedures and to aggran-
dize the judiciary’s role in the constitutional design.”100 
It followed that exacting attention to a statute’s wording was 
the sole acceptable method by which judges could determine what 
the law required. Engagement with the relatively raw, value-
laden language surrounding the passage of bills was both unnec-
essary and improper. By directing judges to focus on the semantic 
structure of statutory texts rather than the policy debates sur-
rounding their passage, new textualism thus proposed to rescue 
the legitimacy of courts from the politically contentious chaos of 
modern lawmaking. Consistent application of interpretive canons 
to determine statutory meaning, moreover, would bring order to 
that chaos by spurring Congress to engage in more careful legis-
lative drafting.101 
 
 97 Id at 630–31. 
 98 See, for example, Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U Chi L Rev 533, 
544–51 (1983); Kenneth W. Starr, Observations about the Use of Legislative History, 1987 
Duke L J 371, 375–79. 
 99 See, for example, Immigration and Naturalization Service v Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 
US 421, 452–53 (1987) (Scalia concurring in the judgment) (“Judges interpret laws rather 
than reconstruct legislators’ intentions. Where the language of those laws is clear, we are 
not free to replace it with an unenacted legislative intent.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, The 
Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 Harv J L & Pub Pol 59, 60 (1988) 
(“The words of the statute, and not the intent of the drafters, are the ‘law.’”). 
 100 Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 Colum L Rev 1, 27 (2006). 
 101 See Finley v United States, 490 US 545, 556 (1989) (Scalia) (“What is of paramount 
importance is that Congress be able to legislate against a background of clear interpretive 
rules, so that it may know the effect of the language it adopts.”). 
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The theory of new textualism was suspected from the start of 
being a political project aimed at restraining judicial and legisla-
tive efforts to create a more liberal administrative state.102 Although 
these suspicions helped prompt a rapid scholarly response, critics 
generally engaged new textualism on its own depoliticized and 
proceduralist terms, focusing on the nuances of public choice and 
constitutional design. Professors Daniel Farber and Philip 
Frickey, for instance, argued that the public-choice analysis so 
popular with new textualists was “compatible with a more re-
spectful attitude toward legislative intent,”103 while their four cor-
ners approach to statutory interpretation belied their own com-
mitment to being “honest agents of the political branches.”104 A 
series of internal critiques soon followed. New textualists, it was 
alleged, assumed without warrant that courts treat nonstatutory 
legislative materials as sources of law rather than sources of evi-
dence.105 New textualists undermined their own program by rely-
ing on a range of nonstatutory materials (from dictionaries to can-
ons of construction to past precedents) to say what the law is;106 
they also imputed intentions to Congress when deploying inter-
pretive devices such as the absurdity doctrine.107 New textualists’ 
unprecedented refusal to consider legislative history actually ag-
grandized courts at the expense of Congress, given that legisla-
tors write laws against a backdrop of past judicial practice.108 
 
 102 See, for example, Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Inter-
pretation of Federal Statutes, 32 Wm & Mary L Rev 827, 834 (1991) (“Is this retreat to the 
text merely a conservative plot to undermine liberal statutes?”); Note, Intent, Clear State-
ments, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 Harv L 
Rev 892, 912 (1982) (arguing that textualist methodology supports an “implicit resurrec-
tion of laissez-faire individualism” that “undermines the legitimacy of congressional legis-
lation”). See also Molot, 106 Colum L Rev at 25 (cited in note 100) (observing that the new 
textualism could be seen as “one prong of a multipronged backlash against what was per-
ceived to be a liberal and activist Warren Court era”). 
 103 Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 
Va L Rev 423, 424 (1988). 
 104 Id at 459, quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court 1983 Term—Fore-
word: The Court and the Economic System, 98 Harv L Rev 4, 60 (1984). 
 105 See Mashaw, 32 Wm & Mary L Rev at 844 (cited in note 102). 
 106 See Eskridge, 37 UCLA L Rev at 674–76, 679–83 (cited in note 90); John F. Manning, 
Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 Colum L Rev 673, 702–05 (1997). 
 107 See Bradley C. Karkkainen, “Plain Meaning”: Justice Scalia’s Jurisprudence of 
Strict Statutory Construction, 17 Harv J L & Pub Pol 401, 422 (1994); William D. Popkin, 
An “Internal” Critique of Justice Scalia’s Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76 Minn L 
Rev 1133, 1163 (1992). 
 108 See Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Con-
struing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 Am U L Rev 
277, 306–07 (1990). 
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New textualists quickly adapted to these critiques, and gave 
up a good deal of ground in the process. As early as 1989, Scalia 
acknowledged that various interpretive canons used by textual-
ists required courts to engage in purposive analysis and to con-
sider public policy.109 The legitimacy of these canons, he would 
later explain, rests on a theory of implicit delegation of interpre-
tive authority from Congress to the courts (or to agencies).110 By 
1994, Easterbrook was prepared to concede that “‘[p]lain mean-
ing’ as a way to understand language is silly”111 and to embrace 
the importance of contextual evidence.112 Three years later, lead-
ing textualist theorist Professor John Manning proposed that 
Scalia’s sweeping bicameralism-and-presentment argument 
against legislative history be replaced with a much narrower 
proposition: that nonstatutory materials such as committee re-
ports could not authoritatively settle statutory meaning, as this 
would imply an impermissible “self-delegation” of legislative au-
thority from Congress to an entity under its control.113 Manning’s 
argument not only was more esoteric than Scalia’s; it also con-
templated and indeed championed recourse to legislative history 
as a means to “add substantial value to the interpretive process 
by supplying a well-informed, contemporaneous account of the 
relevant background to the enactment.”114 Surveying the theory’s 
development a decade after Manning wrote those words, Profes-
sor Jonathan Molot concluded that textualists “have been so 
successful . . . [at] distinguishing their new brand of ‘modern tex-
tualism’ from the older, more extreme ‘plain meaning’ school, that 
 
 109 See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 
1989 Duke L J 511, 515 (discussing the canon of avoiding “absurd” results). 
 110 See Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 35 
(Princeton 1997) (“Whatever Congress has not itself prescribed is left to be resolved by the 
executive or (ultimately) the judicial branch.”). 
 111 Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 
Harv J L & Pub Pol 61, 67 (1994). 
 112 Id at 64 (“Because interpretation is a social enterprise, because words have no 
natural meanings, and because their effect lies in context, we must consult these contexts.”). 
 113 Manning, 97 Colum L Rev at 710–19 (cited in note 106). 
 114 Id at 732. See also John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 Cal L Rev 
1287, 1289–90 (2010) (arguing that “[r]ather than focusing primarily on the broader ques-
tion of whether to use legislative history generally, second-generation textualism empha-
sizes that judges in our system of government have a duty to enforce clearly worded stat-
utes as written”). Manning has suggested an evolutionary narrative largely 
complementary to our own, in which critics of “first-generation textualism” ultimately “im-
proved, perhaps even saved, textualism by calling into question its early reliance on deeply 
cynical arguments about the legislative process”—thus pushing textualists away from 
public-choice theory and toward more palatable constitutional justifications. Id at 1289. 
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they no longer can identify, let alone conquer, any remaining ter-
ritory between textualism’s adherents and nonadherents.”115 New 
textualism had worked itself impure. 
Molot oversimplifies, however, in attributing this develop-
ment to the new textualists’ quick and canny responses to criti-
cisms (or graceful concessions of defeat).116 An additional impetus 
to impurification came from the other side—from the efforts of the 
theory’s critics to adapt it to their own normative ends. For even 
as they rejected new textualism’s rigid conception of the separa-
tion of powers and its specific applications by judges like 
Easterbrook and Scalia, left-leaning skeptics increasingly came to 
view the theory as a useful corrective to purposivism’s own con-
servative tendencies. New textualism developed in parallel with 
a literature challenging overly “archeological”117 or “static”118 ap-
proaches to statutory interpretation, which assumed that the 
meaning of a statute was fixed at the time of its passage.119 On 
both democratic and hermeneutic grounds, a range of liberal 
scholars supported a more “dynamic” approach, and some of them 
argued that new textualism, properly understood, did so as 
well.120 Whatever its original political connotations, new textual-
ism helpfully dispelled the fetishism of legislative intent and pro-
vided reasons to set aside legislative history, at least when such 
history was contrary to interpretations that were textually plau-
sible and socially preferable. The vitality of this connection be-
tween a liberal commitment to judicial-legislative dynamism and 
a liberal openness to textualism (in highly adulterated form) can 
be seen today in scholarship that identifies and endorses new 
 
 115 Molot, 106 Colum L Rev at 2 (cited in note 100). 
 116 See id at 34 (“Textualists have been able to win over new adherents and influence 
nonadherents in large part because they have updated textualism and broadened its appeal.”). 
 117 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 Mich L Rev 20, 
21 (1988). 
 118 Peter L. Strauss, On Resegregating the Worlds of Statute and Common Law, 1994 
S Ct Rev 429, 436–37. 
 119 For examples of works advocating a more dynamic approach, see generally Calabresi, 
A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (cited in note 15); Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 
(Belknap 1986); James Willard Hurst, Dealing with Statutes (Columbia 1982); William N. 
Eskridge Jr, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U Pa L Rev 1479 (1987). 
 120 See, for example, Eskridge, 37 UCLA L Rev at 625 (cited in note 90) (“Notwith-
standing reservations about the new textualism, I endorse its critique of the ‘archaeologi-
cal’ rhetoric used by the Court.”); Mashaw, 32 Wm & Mary L Rev at 835–36 (cited in 
note 102) (stating, “I am not at all convinced that we should so easily dismiss textualism,” 
as “the exclusion of legislative history is more likely to increase the flexibility of statutes 
than to render them static or rigid”). 
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fields of federal common law, along with the proliferation of novel 
interpretive canons.121 
To be sure, one can still find “old” new textualists who, at 
least some of the time, seek to maintain the purity of the theory’s 
aversion to purposivism and intentionalism.122 But if the Roberts 
Court’s recent jurisprudence is any indication, these efforts rep-
resent a rearguard action, and a highly adulterated new textual-
ism reigns supreme. King v Burwell123 supplies a particularly sig-
nificant example.124 In King, Chief Justice John Roberts’s opinion 
for the Court cites no legislative history in construing the Affordable 
Care Act125 (ACA)—apparently basing its interpretation of an 
“ambiguous” statutory provision on a reading of that provision in 
the context of the statutory text as a whole and the application of 
several traditional interpretive canons.126 As just described, the 
Court’s approach sounds like a stringent form of textualism. Yet, 
as Scalia emphasized in dissent, the degree to which the provision 
was ambiguous was itself unclear.127 Roberts discerned from the 
“long history of failed health insurance reform” leading up to the 
 
 121 See Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: Erie for 
the Age of Statutes, 54 Wm & Mary L Rev 753, 806 (2013) (arguing that conceptualizing 
interpretive canons as a form of “federal common law . . . could facilitate the kind of inter-
pretive feedback loop between the Court and Congress that many have desired but some 
have thought impossible”); Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 
80 Geo Wash L Rev 1293, 1351 (2012) (defending the legitimacy of administrative common 
law on the ground that, “given its constitutional underpinnings,” it “bears a close resem-
blance to the use of constitutionally based canons of interpretation and clear statement 
rules”). 
 122 See, for example, John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 Harv L Rev 2387, 
2393–2431 (2003) (criticizing the absurdity doctrine for overestimating judicial under-
standing of legislative purpose). Professor Jonathan Siegel has proposed that “textualism’s 
fundamental axiom, combined with the tendency of the law to work itself pure,” inexorably 
lead textualism “to make itself progressively more radical and, therefore, less workable.” 
Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U Pa L Rev 117, 
120–22 (2009). We believe Siegel has things backward. In focusing on the logic of textual-
ism’s internal “axioms,” Siegel misses all of the external dynamics that allow such axioms 
to be reconceptualized or reformulated in response to criticism—and that prevent main-
stream prescriptive legal theories, more generally, from tending toward radicalism. 
 123 135 S Ct 2480 (2015). 
 124 Professor Richard Re has identified several other cases that fit this mold in addi-
tion to King, including Yates v United States, 135 S Ct 1074 (2015), and Bond v United 
States, 134 S Ct 2077 (2014). See Richard M. Re, The New Holy Trinity, 18 Green Bag 2d 
407, 409–15 (2015). 
 125 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub L No 111-148, 124 Stat 119 (2010). 
 126 King, 135 S Ct at 2491–96. 
 127 Id at 2501–03 (Scalia dissenting). 
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ACA128 a “legislative plan” to expand access to coverage.129 In light 
of this plan, the meaning of the disputed provision became ambig-
uous, as its most literal interpretation would result in the failure 
to provide subsidies to millions of people legally obligated to pur-
chase insurance.130 Roberts then resolved the ambiguity in a man-
ner that was both permitted by the ACA’s text and accorded with 
its goals.131 
Distinguishing itself from the old purposivism, the Court’s 
decision in King goes out of its way to establish that its interpre-
tation “can fairly be read” from the statutory text.132 Yet the 
Court’s “key move,” as Professor Richard Re observes, is to inte-
grate purposive considerations into the threshold “identification 
of textual clarity or ambiguity.”133 It has been suggested that the 
remaining divide between textualists and nontextualists gener-
ally reduces to disagreements over whether a particular statutory 
provision is or is not unambiguous.134 In its highly adulterated 
form, however, new textualism encompasses both poles of this de-
bate: just compare the majority and dissenting opinions in King. 
As the King litigation further demonstrates, the original political 
controversy that new textualism sought to resolve—about how 
judges should respond to the growth of the administrative state—
is now being reprised within the terms of the theory. 
C. From Popular Constitutionalism to Democratic 
Constitutionalism 
Compared to originalism and textualism, popular constitu-
tionalism has passed through the stages of the life cycle at an ac-
celerated pace. It burst on the intellectual scene and then was 
quickly reworked. The story of popular constitutionalism’s im-
purification is also comparatively straightforward, in our view, so 
we will tell it quickly. 
 
 128 Id at 2485. 
 129 Id at 2496. 
 130 See King, 135 S Ct at 2490. 
 131 See id at 2494–95. 
 132 Id at 2496. 
 133 Re, 18 Green Bag 2d at 417 (cited in note 124). See also Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect 
Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding Congress’s Plan in the Era of Unorthodox Law-
making, 129 Harv L Rev 62, 64 (2015) (observing that King’s references to “Congress’s 
‘plan’” send “a strong message about Congress’s rationality and the inherent purposive-
ness and functionality of legislation”). 
 134 See Molot, 106 Colum L Rev at 45–46 (cited in note 100). 
 2016] Working Themselves Impure 1855 
 
Although its basic themes have been explored many times 
since the Founding, the emergence of popular constitutionalism 
as a distinctive contemporary theory is often pegged to the publi-
cation of works such as Professor Mark Tushnet’s book Taking the 
Constitution Away from the Courts135 and Professor Larry Kramer’s 
article We the Court136 around the turn of the millennium.137 
Alarmed by the conservative “activism” of the Rehnquist Court 
and the ethic of “judicial supremacy”138 that enabled it, Kramer 
and Tushnet drew on history to argue for a relocation of authority 
over constitutional interpretation and enforcement to “the people 
themselves.” Both their rhetoric and their reform ideas were brac-
ing. Americans should consider “doing away with judicial re-
view.”139 When the Court becomes “overly assertive,” Congress 
and the president should stand ready to “slash[ ]” its budget, 
impeach its members, “strip it of jurisdiction,” and “ignore its 
mandates.”140 The occasional rowdy mob might be useful too.141 
 
 135 See generally Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts 
(Princeton 1999). 
 136 See generally Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term—Foreword: We the 
Court, 115 Harv L Rev 4 (2001). Kramer subsequently expanded his foreword into a book. 
See generally Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and 
Judicial Review (Oxford 2004). 
 137 See, for example, Tom Donnelly, Making Popular Constitutionalism Work, 2012 
Wis L Rev 159, 160 n 1, 163 (describing Kramer’s and Tushnet’s writings as among “the 
leading normative theories of popular constitutionalism” and Kramer as “popular consti-
tutionalism’s ‘Founding Father’”). For a fuller list of scholars associated with the emer-
gence of contemporary popular constitutionalism, see Doni Gewirtzman, Glory Days: Pop-
ular Constitutionalism, Nostalgia, and the True Nature of Constitutional Culture, 93 
Georgetown L J 897, 897–99 (2005) (highlighting the contributions of Professor Richard 
Parker in particular). 
 138 See, for example, Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts at 6–32 
(cited in note 135) (criticizing “judicial supremacy”); Kramer, 115 Harv L Rev at 128–69 
(cited in note 136) (condemning the Rehnquist Court’s “[a]ssault on [p]opular [c]onstitu-
tionalism,” and its “philosophy of judicial sovereignty”); Larry D. Kramer, No Surprise. It’s 
an Activist Court. (NY Times, Dec 12, 2000), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/12/ 
opinion/no-surprise-it-s-an-activist-court.html (visited Sept 27, 2016) (Perma archive un-
available) (“[C]onservative judicial activism is the order of the day. The Warren Court was 
retiring compared to the present one.”). “Popular constitutionalists reserve[d] their fierc-
est criticism for the Rehnquist Court’s ‘Section Five’ decisions,” such as City of Boerne v 
Flores, 521 US 507 (1997), which limited Congress’s power to regulate discrimination un-
der § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. John F. Preis, Constitutional Enforcement by Proxy, 
95 Va L Rev 1663, 1725 (2009). 
 139 Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts at 154 (cited in note 135). 
 140 Kramer, The People Themselves at 249 (cited in note 136). 
 141 See David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 Colum 
L Rev 2047, 2062 (2010) (noting that “Kramer repeatedly and sympathetically refers to 
[mobbing] in The People Themselves”). 
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Leading popular constitutionalists such as Kramer and Tushnet 
did not specify any single decision procedure—they differed in 
this regard from their counterparts in the originalism, textual-
ism, and CBA movements—but their prescriptions likewise con-
centrated on the manner in which legal questions are resolved, in 
view of an overriding high-level goal (here, popular sovereignty). 
Critics on the political left as well as the right quickly 
mounted a range of objections. Popular constitutionalism, many 
worried, would debilitate judicial authority and jeopardize minor-
ity rights142 and individual rights.143 Its judgments rested on 
overly pessimistic premises about the aloofness of the Court144 and 
overly optimistic premises about the capacities and interests of or-
dinary citizens.145 Ironically, popular constitutionalism would prove 
unpopular in practice, given the American public’s long-standing 
 
 142 See, for example, Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Review: The Perils of 
Popular Constitutionalism, 2004 U Ill L Rev 673, 690 (“Popular constitutionalism’s central 
flaw is its failure to recognize that the protection of minorities and their rights cannot rely 
on the majority.”). See also Donnelly, 2012 Wis L Rev at 166 & n 24 (cited in note 137) 
(collecting sources arguing that “Kramer’s brand of popular constitutionalism” is “too rad-
ical” and will “result in majoritarian tyranny”). 
 143 See, for example, Scott D. Gerber, The Court, the Constitution, and the History of 
Ideas, 61 Vand L Rev 1067, 1071 (2008) (criticizing popular constitutionalism for failing 
to see “that judicial review, robustly practiced, is an indispensable mechanism for protect-
ing the individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution”). 
 144 See, for example, Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 Mich 
L Rev 2596, 2598–99 (2003) (arguing that “there is substantial congruity between popular 
opinion and the decisions of constitutional judges,” which “suggests that popular constitu-
tionalists may be getting what they want” indirectly). 
 145 See, for example, Neal Devins, Book Review, The D’oh! of Popular Constitutional-
ism, 105 Mich L Rev 1333, 1335 (2007) (“[T]he people are uninterested in the Constitution 
and the Supreme Court.”); Gewirtzman, 93 Georgetown L J at 899 (cited in note 137) (crit-
icizing popular constitutionalism for romanticizing “the People” and ignoring evidence 
that “participation and interest in politics are declining” and “popular interpretive opin-
ions are often based on limited information, and are highly susceptible to manipulation by 
elites”). See also Richard A. Posner, Book Review, The People’s Court, New Republic 32, 
35 (July 19, 2004) (“The very concept [of popular constitutionalism] is barely intelligible. 
. . . There is no federal town meeting at which 200 million adult Americans could deliber-
ate and then take a vote.”). 
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support for judicial supremacy.146 If the theory somehow were to 
take hold, might it not lead to anarchy?147 
Scholarship identified with popular constitutionalism began 
to splinter. One strain sought to deepen the case against judicial 
review.148 A much larger and more conciliatory strain, however, 
attempted to parry the first wave of objections by softening popu-
lar constitutionalism’s conception of the “popular.” Kramer him-
self led the way. Responding to his critics, Kramer explained in 
2006 that he was not calling for “direct action” or the abolition of 
judicial review, but rather for richer constitutional deliberation 
and the “mediation” of popular will “through formal institutions 
of government.”149 While devices such as “ignoring mandates, 
budget cutting, jurisdiction stripping, court packing, and the like” 
may be preferable to “nothing,” Kramer suggested, there are 
many subtler ways of exerting political pressure on the courts and 
thereby ensuring popular control over constitutional law.150 
As Tom Donnelly has noted, “[i]t is unclear whether this 
[was] simply a clarification of [Kramer’s] original intended posi-
tion, a reevaluation based on thoughtful criticisms, or something 
in between.”151 Regardless, the message was clear that popular 
constitutionalism does not necessarily require populism in any 
 
 146 See, for example, Larry Alexander and Lawrence B. Solum, Book Review, Popular? 
Constitutionalism?, 118 Harv L Rev 1594, 1637 (2005) (“[T]he idea that the judicial branch 
should act as the final and authoritative interpreter of the Constitution has been a pro-
foundly popular one.”); Greene, Book Review, 117 Yale L J at 919 (cited in note 39) (sub-
mitting that constitutional theorists “who would make [the case against judicial review] 
must confront the possibility that the people have spoken and that [the theorists] just do 
not like the answer”). 
 147 See, for example, Alexander and Solum, Book Review, 118 Harv L Rev at 1611, 
1613 (cited in note 146) (contending that certain versions of popular constitutionalism 
could lead to “naked power struggles” or “anarchy”). 
 148 See generally, for example, Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case against Judicial 
Review, 115 Yale L J 1346 (2006). In discussing the prior literature, Professor Jeremy 
Waldron lumps together Kramer’s and Tushnet’s books as especially pertinent works “at-
tacking judicial review in America.” Id at 1350. 
 149 Larry Kramer, Response, 81 Chi Kent L Rev 1173, 1175 (2006). See also Larry D. 
Kramer, “The Interest of the Man”: James Madison, Popular Constitutionalism, and the 
Theory of Deliberative Democracy, 41 Valp U L Rev 697, 749 (2006) (advocating a “re-
strained” system of Madisonian “departmentalism,” which “works only if there is enforced 
discipline within the respective branches”). 
 150 Kramer, 41 Valp U L Rev at 749 (cited in note 149). 
 151 Donnelly, 2012 Wis L Rev at 168 (cited in note 137). See also Knowles and Toia, 
42 S U L Rev at 43 (cited in note 57) (“Since the publication of The People Themselves, 
Kramer has not helped the definitional cause of ‘popular constitutionalism.’ He has con-
tinued to move away from the language of his foreword which lobbied for ‘an ever-shrinking 
role for the Court.’”). 
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recognizable form; rather, it can and should be effectuated 
through democratically accountable institutions. Sympathetic 
scholars increasingly began to migrate away from Kramer’s ter-
minology in favor of the more decorous label of “democratic con-
stitutionalism” proposed by Professors Robert Post and Reva 
Siegel.152 Foreshadowing this shift, Kramer slipped without ex-
planation from “popular constitutionalism” to “democratic consti-
tutionalism” in the penultimate sentence of a 2006 response 
piece.153 
Once the key adulterating move to “mediating” structures 
was made, it turned out that popular constitutionalism was every-
where. Scholars began to locate the practice of, or potential for, 
popular constitutionalism in an ever-growing list of institutions, 
from the federal Congress154 and executive branch,155 to state ju-
dicial elections156 and attorneys general,157 to the lower federal 
courts.158 Even the Supreme Court could be recast as an agent ra-
ther than an enemy of popular constitutionalism, given the em-
pirical evidence showing that its opinions tend to stay within the 
 
 152 Robert Post and Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Back-
lash, 42 Harv CR–CL L Rev 373, 374 (2007). 
 153 Kramer, 81 Chi Kent L Rev at 1182 (cited in note 149). Although its populist cre-
dentials are disputed by some, the Tea Party movement’s subsequent emergence seems to 
have pushed liberal scholars still further away from “pure” versions of popular constitu-
tionalism. See, for example, Jared A. Goldstein, Can Popular Constitutionalism Survive 
the Tea Party Movement?, 105 Nw U L Rev 1807, 1808–10 (2011) (arguing that the Tea 
Party movement’s “militantly nationalist” constitutional vision “calls into question” the 
idea that popular constitutionalism advances “democratic values”); Christopher W. 
Schmidt, Popular Constitutionalism on the Right: Lessons from the Tea Party, 88 Denver 
U L Rev 523, 525–26 (2011) (suggesting that the Tea Party challenges the “underlying 
assumption behind much of the scholarship on popular constitutionalism” that popular 
claims on the Constitution will tend to promote liberal causes). 
 154 See generally, for example, Robert C. Post and Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Consti-
tutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical 
Leave Act, 112 Yale L J 1943 (2003). See also Donnelly, 2012 Wis L Rev at 177–86 (cited 
in note 137). 
 155 See generally Jedediah Purdy, Presidential Popular Constitutionalism, 77 Fordham 
L Rev 1837 (2009). 
 156 See Pozen, 110 Colum L Rev at 2064–86 (cited in note 141); David E. Pozen, What 
Happened in Iowa?, 111 Colum L Rev Sidebar 90, 91–93 (2011). 
 157 See generally Joseph Blocher, Popular Constitutionalism and the State Attorneys 
General, 122 Harv L Rev F 108 (2011). 
 158 See generally Ori Aronson, Inferiorizing Judicial Review: Popular Constitutional-
ism in Trial Courts, 43 U Mich J L Ref 971 (2010); Katie Eyer, Lower Court Popular Con-
stitutionalism, 123 Yale L J Online 197 (2013). 
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mainstream of public opinion.159 Indeed, even Supreme Court de-
cisions striking down progressive federal laws for exceeding the 
scope of Congress’s enumerated powers—the very paradigm of ju-
dicial activism that stirred Kramer to such righteous anger—
might be recast as victories for popular constitutionalism, given 
their arguable benefits to democratic deliberation.160 
Popular constitutionalism has thus crossed the political aisle 
and become increasingly self-contradictory. The theory has not 
simply failed to dispel controversy over the Court’s constitutional 
jurisprudence or to make any appreciable dent in judicial suprem-
acy. It has given proponents of robust judicial review a new lan-
guage of legitimation—just like originalism. 
D. From Quantitative CBA to “Qualitative” CBA 
While CBA is an expansive term with a long intellectual and 
political history,161 CBA as a prescriptive theory of public law 
emerged as a distinct discourse in the legal academy in the 1980s. 
It did so in response to the growth of CBA in judicial review of 
 
 159 See Friedman, 101 Mich L Rev at 2596–2613 (cited in note 144) (developing this 
argument at length). See also generally, for example, Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: 
Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 Harv L Rev 191 (2008) (analyzing 
the Court’s originalist decision in District of Columbia v Heller, 554 US 570 (2008), as the 
product of popular constitutionalism). 
 160 See, for example, Roderick M. Hills Jr, The Individual Right to Federalism in the 
Rehnquist Court, 74 Geo Wash L Rev 888, 903 (2006) (“[T]he Rehnquist Court’s restriction 
of Congress’s power to redefine Fourteenth Amendment liberty . . . is not suppression of 
popular constitutionalism: it is judicial promotion of popular constitutionalism because 
these decisions protect nonfederal debate from the jurispathic tendencies of federal legis-
lation to curtail such debate.”). Some scholars on the left, meanwhile, began to argue that 
mechanisms of direct democracy such as constitutional ballot initiatives do not count as 
popular constitutionalism. See, for example, Raphael Rajendra, “The People” and “The 
People”: Disaggregating Citizen Lawmaking from Popular Constitutionalism, 27 L & Inequal-
ity 53, 84–91 (2009). See also Pozen, 110 Colum L Rev at 2122 n 296 (cited in note 141) 
(questioning “whether the vocabulary of ‘popular constitutionalism’ has ceased to advance 
comprehension”). 
 161 CBA developed out of early twentieth-century welfare economics and has played 
an intermittent role in administrative decisionmaking since the New Deal. See Adler and 
Posner, 109 Yale L J at 169–72 (cited in note 42) (discussing welfare economics as the 
theoretical origin of CBA and the early use of CBA in New Deal flood-control projects). But 
CBA first achieved sustained attention in the legal academy via the law and economics 
movement, which focused initially on private law. See, for example, Kennedy, 33 Stan L 
Rev at 387 (cited in note 34) (describing law and economics in 1981 as “the body of litera-
ture and taught tradition that proposes and elaborates cost-benefit analysis as a way for 
a policy maker to decide what private law rules to recommend to judges, legislators or 
administrators”). 
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administrative action162 and, more significantly, the increasing 
use of CBA by administrators themselves.163 The latter trend 
reached its initial, controversial culmination in the Reagan ad-
ministration’s 1981 executive order directing agencies to imple-
ment regulations only when “the potential benefits to society . . . 
outweigh the potential costs.”164 This requirement marked a deci-
sive intervention in the long-running—and, by 1981, increasingly 
politically contentious—debate over the efficacy and legitimacy of 
the administrative state.165 
Most participants in this debate agreed that the administra-
tive state was beset by “regulatory failure,” but their diagnoses 
and proposed solutions differed sharply.166 Some argued that the 
central problem was capture of agencies by regulated industries 
and the consequent harm to regulatory beneficiaries.167 Others ar-
gued that the key problem was agencies’ heedless advocacy on behalf 
of putative beneficiaries, at the expense of regulated industries 
 
 162 See, for example, Industrial Union Department, AFL–CIO v American Petroleum 
Institute, 448 US 607, 644–45 (1980) (finding that the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration failed to perform adequate CBA when regulating benzene levels in the 
workplace); Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319, 348–49 (1976) (employing a form of CBA to 
resolve a welfare recipient’s procedural due process claim). See also Jerry L. Mashaw, The 
Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: 
Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U Chi L Rev 28, 48 (1976) (criticizing “the 
utilitarian balancing analysis” used by the Court in cases such as Mathews). 
 163 See Adler and Posner, 109 Yale L J at 167, 170–71 (cited in note 42) (describing 
the reemergence and routinization of CBA in government agencies in the 1980s). See also 
Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Empty Call for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Financial Regulation, 43 
J Legal Stud S351, S355–58 (2014) (tracing the origins of public law CBA to the movement 
of “health-and-safety regulation [ ] from the decentralized tort system to the centralized 
administrative system of the modern regulatory state” during the 1970s and 1980s). 
 164 Executive Order 12291 § 2(b) (1981), 3 CFR 127, 128. 
 165 See Richard H. Pildes and Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 
U Chi L Rev 1, 3–6 (1995) (discussing the controversy engendered by Executive Or-
der 12291 and a follow-on order); Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Separa-
tion of Powers, 23 Ariz L Rev 1267, 1268 (1981) (“Although there are historical antecedents 
for [Executive Order 12291], no other President has gone nearly so far. In particular, no 
other President has provided that regulatory action may not be initiated unless the bene-
fits exceed the costs.”) (citation omitted). On the politics of administrative governance in 
the preceding decades, see generally Reuel E. Schiller, Enlarging the Administrative Pol-
ity: Administrative Law and the Changing Definition of Pluralism, 1945–1970, 53 Vand L 
Rev 1389 (2000). 
 166 Sunstein, 23 Ariz L Rev at 1269 (cited in note 165) (reviewing this debate). 
 167 See, for example, George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J 
Econ & Mgmt Sci 3 (1971) (suggesting a causal link between regulated party pressure and 
administrative outcomes). See also Joanna L. Grisinger, The Unwieldy American State: 
Administrative Politics since the New Deal 195–250 (Cambridge 2012) (discussing the ori-
gins of capture theory). 
 2016] Working Themselves Impure 1861 
 
and the economic welfare of the nation as a whole.168 A third camp 
suggested that forces of bureaucratic entrenchment and self-
aggrandizement were leading agencies further and further away 
from their statutorily imposed missions.169 
The Reagan administration’s CBA policy was seen to take 
sides in this dispute. As Professor Cass Sunstein noted shortly 
after the publication of the executive order, its implicit diagnosis 
of regulatory failure was that “regulation has been unduly intru-
sive on the private sector.”170 The administration’s solution, more-
over, was undergirded by a particular “normative conception” of 
the administrative state: namely, that “the purpose of regula-
tion—at least as a general rule—is to promote economic ‘effi-
ciency,’ or to increase production, by compensating for free rider 
effects and transactions cost barriers to bargaining.”171 The exec-
utive order did not define “costs” and “benefits” in explicitly eco-
nomic terms. Yet, as Sunstein concluded, “the language of the or-
der, as well as the rhetoric used during its implementation, 
indicate[d] that it [was] intended to ensure that regulatory deci-
sions will promote economic ‘efficiency.’”172 
Interpreted in this way, as imposing a “wealth maximization” 
requirement on the administrative state,173 the 1981 order instan-
tiated a potentially inflammatory prescriptive theory of public 
law. It ignored the leading alternative accounts of regulatory fail-
ure: capture and self-aggrandizement. And it appeared to endorse 
a rigidly welfarist version of CBA, one that economists and lawyers 
had spent more than a decade attacking for its theoretical refusal 
or practical inability to accommodate distributional concerns and 
other “soft” variables.174 Nonetheless, Sunstein offered a qualified 
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defense of the executive order’s implicit theory, insisting that “the 
conception of the regulatory process reflected in the order is pecu-
liarly well-suited to the institutional competence of the executive 
branch.”175 Nor was Sunstein alone among progressive legal theo-
rists in supporting the Reagan administration’s initiative. As Pro-
fessor Susan Rose-Ackerman summarized the state of affairs in 
the early 1980s: 
At the level of broad substantive principle there was agree-
ment between the Reagan administration and Progressivism 
on the need for regulatory reform. Both believed that govern-
ment intervention in the economy should be justified by ref-
erence to market failures and that, insofar as possible, cost-
benefit tests should be used to set regulatory policy.176 
Of course, progressives were not blind to the deregulatory po-
tential of CBA. Sunstein’s support was premised on the argument 
that the Reagan administration’s order contained an internal 
mechanism for taming the excesses of CBA, in its proviso that 
CBA be used “to the extent permitted by law.”177 What this meant, 
according to Sunstein, was that the CBA directive applied only to 
a subset of statutes: those whose efficiency-promoting implemen-
tation would not frustrate legislative purposes and thus compro-
mise the separation of powers.178 Given that “the questions faced 
by Congress . . . are predominantly distributional,” Sunstein rea-
soned, many statutes would not be subject to efficiency maximi-
zation.179 Other statutes, however, appear to seek efficiency—for 
example, certain antitrust laws and laws “protecting against an 
‘unreasonable risk’ to health or safety”—and so would fit comfort-
ably with the logic of CBA.180 Still other statutes, including many 
antipollution laws, “have some effects which maximize wealth, 
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and some that do not.”181 In these cases, an agency could choose 
to enforce “only the efficiency-promoting applications” of the law, 
so long as this “exclusive implementation [did] not fundamentally 
conflict with legislative purposes.”182 In addition, CBA could be 
used by agencies to select the most “cost-effective approaches” 
to implementation that vindicated Congress’s non-efficiency-
maximizing aims, to “identify the costs and benefits of regulatory 
proposals with a view to statutory reform or ordering priorities,” 
and to “decline to act in exceptional cases of de minimis benefits 
and high costs.”183 
By imposing a separation-of-powers decision procedure on top 
of CBA’s own decision procedure, Sunstein effectively delegated 
the task of resolving many of the traditional critiques of CBA to 
an idealized model of administrative decisionmaking. For in-
stance, the complaint that CBA fails to consider distributional or 
deontological values became something of a non sequitur in 
Sunstein’s scheme. It was simply against the law for administra-
tors to use CBA to implement statutes with solely distributional 
goals, or to implement a statute’s efficiency-promoting provisions 
in a manner that “fundamentally conflict[s]” with the statute’s 
other, non-efficiency-promoting purposes.184 
Over the course of the 1980s, actual administrative practice 
would frustrate this idealized model. An “atmosphere of scandal” 
thickened around the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
in particular, as rumors swirled that the president’s Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB)—responsible for oversight of 
the CBA initiative—had “illegally delayed EPA promulgation of 
regulations” and “subverted statutory standards.”185 Mass resig-
nations followed in 1983, and the new administrator, brought in 
to restore public confidence, fared little better. His “plan to pro-
pose a modest acid rain control program was vetoed after OMB 
Director David Stockman” determined “that it would cost several 
thousand dollars per pound of fish saved.”186 
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Against this political backdrop, academic criticism of public 
law CBA intensified. Scholars issued new challenges to CBA’s el-
evation of economic efficiency to the status of a legal norm. No 
defensible theory of regulation, many argued, could justify the 
categorical privileging of efficiency over other public values or in-
dividual preferences.187 CBA’s exaltation of efficiency would lead, 
instead, to a “lack of balance.”188 The Reagan administration’s 
CBA program, for example, allegedly “focused almost exclusively 
on reducing costs to industry.”189 Critics also questioned the abil-
ity of CBA to accurately price goods “not normally bought and sold 
on markets”—the sorts of goods that regulators so often have to 
take into account.190 
By the 1990s, these criticisms (and the experience of two Re-
publican presidencies) had chastened those politically progressive 
legal theorists who had been initially supportive of the Reagan 
administration’s CBA initiative.191 When the Clinton administration 
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introduced its own “Regulatory Planning and Review” executive 
order in 1993,192 Sunstein and his coauthor Professor Richard Pildes 
characterized it as a “quite surprising step.”193 President Bill 
Clinton’s order had retained the Reagan-era “emphasis on cost-
benefit analysis as the basic foundation of decision,” they ob-
served, but it also “include[d] a new, complex, and somewhat un-
ruly set of substantive principles,” some of which “qualif[ied] the 
commitment to cost-benefit analysis, though in ambiguous ways,” 
and some of which were “of uncertain legality.”194 In response to 
this continuation and complication of Reagan-era CBA policy, Pildes 
and Sunstein offered “a range of proposals designed” to “simulta-
neously promot[e] economic and democratic goals.”195 These pro-
posals amounted to a significant impurification of the theory of 
efficiency-maximizing CBA that Sunstein had defended fourteen 
years earlier. “Regulations should be evaluated not only in terms 
of aggregate costs and benefits,” Pildes and Sunstein wrote, “but 
also in terms that reflect democratic judgments about qualitative 
differences among qualitatively different risks”—including “an 
understanding of whether a risk is voluntarily incurred, espe-
cially dreaded, equitably distributed, potentially irreversible or 
catastrophic, faced by future generations, or incurred by discrete 
groups within the population.”196 
No longer could formalistic separation-of-powers principles 
be relied upon to prevent CBA from suppressing values sounding 
in distribution, desert, and the like. Indeed, Pildes and Sunstein’s 
rejection of a “single metric” of analysis and their call for a “dis-
aggregated system for assessing the qualitatively different effects of 
regulatory impositions”197 strayed so far from traditional, efficiency-
maximizing CBA that Professors Matthew Adler and Eric Posner 
argued the approach could not be properly characterized as CBA 
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at all.198 Pildes and Sunstein’s approach resembled, rather, the 
sort of “procedure that agencies regularly seem to employ in lieu 
of CBA.”199 
Adler and Posner sought to ward off such impurification. 
Writing in 1999, they explained that the deontological, distribu-
tional, “desert-based,” and “perfectionist” issues (“such as the pur-
ported intrinsic good of preserving endangered species”) that trou-
bled Pildes and Sunstein were “nonwelfarist considerations”—and 
“CBA does not capture, and is not meant to capture, nonwelfarist 
considerations.”200 The political controversy and normative anxi-
ety that welfarist CBA had provoked, in Adler and Posner’s tell-
ing, stemmed from a failure to appreciate that “CBA is a decision 
procedure, not a moral standard.”201 Adler and Posner allowed that 
CBA need not be “the exclusive choice procedure for government,” 
and could be employed “as one part of the overall set of procedures 
and institutions by which projects are ultimately approved, re-
jected, or amended.”202 But they insisted that CBA retain its pure, 
welfarist form, as only in that form can it reliably “enabl[e] agen-
cies to evaluate projects according to the extent that they contrib-
ute to overall well-being.”203 
But such is not the fate of process-oriented public law theo-
ries. Three decades after Sunstein penned his formalistic defense 
of the Reagan administration’s imposition of efficiency-maximizing 
CBA on the executive branch, the Obama administration issued 
an order on “Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review.”204 By 
this time, Sunstein was serving as administrator of the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs, and Executive Order 13563 
reflected the adulterated conception of CBA that Pildes and he had 
proposed in the wake of the backlash to Reagan-era CBA. The or-
der directs agencies to “select, in choosing among alternative reg-
ulatory approaches, those approaches that maximize net benefits 
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(including potential economic, environmental, public health and 
safety, and other advantages; distributive impacts; and eq-
uity).”205 “Where appropriate and permitted by law,” the opening 
section continues, “each agency may consider (and discuss quali-
tatively) values that are difficult or impossible to quantify, includ-
ing equity, human dignity, fairness, and distributive impacts.”206 
The references to “fairness” and “human dignity” were new to this 
line of executive orders,207 and their inclusion led some conserva-
tive commentators to ask sarcastically whether “a rule might pass 
Mr. Obama’s cost-benefit test if it imposes $999 billion in hard 
costs but supposedly results in a $1 trillion increase in human 
dignity.”208 In practice, President Barack Obama has suggested 
that these “soft” variables have done little to disturb traditional, 
quantitative modes of analysis.209 In the law on the books as in 
the academic literature, however, such variables have become in-
creasingly integrated into the methodology of CBA.210 
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By the lights of Adler and Posner, this is no longer CBA. It 
certainly is not the version of CBA that Sunstein endorsed in 1981 
as “peculiarly well-suited to the institutional competence of the 
executive branch.”211 As reflected in the governing executive or-
ders and in Sunstein’s own writings, mainstream CBA has now 
internalized the very same “impossible to quantify”212 values of 
distribution, fairness, and dignity that hounded the administra-
tive state throughout the 1970s and that the Reagan-era propo-
nents of CBA had hoped to transcend. 
IV.  ANALOGUES TO THE LIFE CYCLE THEORY 
The claim that prescriptive legal theories such as the ones 
just discussed tend to become impurified has numerous ana-
logues, both in academic research and in the real-world operation 
of law and politics. Before we examine the implications of our 
claim for legal practice, this Part briefly examines parallels to the 
life cycle model elsewhere in law, political science, and the philos-
ophy of science. Investigating these parallels helps to place our 
model in a larger conceptual context and further establish its 
plausibility. A comparison with the work of Professor Thomas 
Kuhn, in particular, helps to illuminate ways in which the pro-
gress of “legal science” does and does not resemble other fields of 
scientific endeavor. 
A. Analogues in Law 
1. Rules/standards convergence. 
Legal theorists in general, and constitutional theorists in 
particular, have posited life cycle–like processes before. On the 
jurisprudential side, scholars such as Professors Pierre Schlag 
and Frederick Schauer have argued that the putatively funda-
mental distinction between legal rules and legal standards turns 
out to be unstable over time, as rules tend “to evolve or degenerate, 
depending upon our perspective, into standards, and standards to 
evolve or degenerate into rules.”213 Rules are designed to be precise, 
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offering clear ex ante guidance to interested parties. Standards 
are designed to be imprecise, leaving much of their content to be 
worked out on a case-by-case basis pursuant to an overarching 
principle or policy.214 And yet, in practice, these regulatory strat-
egies gradually bleed into one another, as rules become riddled 
with qualifications and exceptions that reduce their clarity and 
standards become concretized through interpretations and under-
standings that reduce their flexibility. 
The literature on rules/standards convergence relates to our 
own theory in at least two noteworthy ways. First, this literature 
sheds some light on the drivers of the life cycle. According to 
Schauer, whenever legal decisionmakers can “permissibly or le-
gitimately or professionally” exercise discretion—and they usu-
ally can—they will be tempted to deploy “rule-avoiding strate-
gies” to prevent the seemingly unjust or unreasonable application 
of a given rule to a given case.215 At the same time, many decision- 
makers will be tempted to rein in the “uncomfortable vague-
ness”216 of standards through “rulification” techniques: “More 
choice is not always better than less, and not every decision-
maker has the time, energy, or inclination to engage in the ‘from 
the ground up’ process that unconstrained discretion and unspec-
ified standards require.”217 The upshot of these paired processes 
of “adaptive behaviour”218 is the de facto merger of rules and 
standards. 
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While the subjects of Schauer’s account are official legal de-
cisionmakers, its behavioral assumptions would seem to apply, at 
least in part, to the reasoning in which legal scholars engage 
when they elaborate prescriptive theories. Presented with a cer-
tain set of rules or standards that a theory appears to endorse 
(“Judges should aspire to promote vague principle X,” “Agencies 
must forswear concrete practice Y”), scholars may similarly seek 
to recalibrate the degree of discretion that the theory affords by 
loosening or tightening its initial formulation. And they may take 
these rule-avoiding or rulifying steps for similar reasons: to arrive 
at more normatively or empirically satisfying legal frameworks, 
to prevent undesirable outcomes in specific cases, to ease their 
analytic burden, to signal restraint, and so on. Such adaptive be-
havior may also help explain how prescriptive legal theories can 
experience significant adulteration without departing from their 
original formalisms. A theory’s core set of rules or standards may 
remain accepted by all those who hold to it, even if different blocs 
of theorists would construe those rules or standards in signifi-
cantly more or less constraining ways.219 
The second point of contact between theories of rules/standards 
convergence and our theory is that some extreme versions of the 
former could be read to anticipate or even subsume the latter. 
From Schlag’s point of view, for instance, the life cycle model may 
simply describe one instance of the “omnipresent” and “irreduc-
ible” dialectic between rules and standards that haunts legal dis-
course.220 Schlag contends that virtually all legal argumentation 
embodies this dialectic and thus follows a predictable path toward 
“refinement or entropy”—but never resolution.221 We are skeptical 
about the sweep of Schlag’s claim.222 But if he were right, then it 
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may seem rather unsurprising to find certain legal theories be-
coming impurified; what demands explanation is the way in 
which this dynamic appears to unfold so much more slowly and 
subtly, if at all, for other sorts of theories. In general, though, the 
jurisprudential literature’s various accounts of rules/standards 
convergence complement our account insofar as each suggests a 
basic instability in efforts to channel legal decisionmaking into a 
relatively pure framework, as well as a concomitant need to ana-
lyze such efforts in dynamic terms. Whether embedded in an au-
thoritative directive or an academic theory, the initial manner in 
which a legal prescription is formulated matters less than is com-
monly supposed.223 
2. Cycles of constitutional theory. 
Beyond these abstract theories about the development of 
rules and standards, we also find analogues (or, at least, adjuncts) 
to our life cycle model in scholarship that identifies a tendency for 
constitutional theory, writ large, to experience politically driven 
cycles. The most sustained argument to this effect appears in Pro-
fessor Barry Friedman’s article The Cycles of Constitutional 
Theory.224 At any given time, according to Friedman, those consti-
tutional scholars who share the Supreme Court’s political orien-
tation will tend to formulate theories that legitimate broad judi-
cial review, while those scholars who disapprove of the Court’s 
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political orientation will tend to promote theories that do the op-
posite. As a result, a generation of “conservative” or “progressive” 
constitutional scholars may, over the course of their careers, shift 
from supporting restrictive to supporting expansive theories of ju-
dicial power (or vice versa).225 Likewise, multiple generations of 
constitutional scholars with the same political orientation may 
adopt contradictory theories of judicial review.226 
Friedman’s account operates on a longer timescale than ours; 
he is concerned with the oscillations across different theories ra-
ther than with the evolution of any given theory. Moreover, what 
cycles back and forth in Friedman’s narrative is a political bloc’s 
general attitude toward judicial review: pro or con. The actual 
content of the operative theories does not necessarily follow 
suit.227 Whereas we seek to explain the trajectories of individual 
legal theories, Friedman seeks to specify the motives that drive 
theory choice. 
Friedman’s account is nonetheless relevant for our purposes, 
both because it illustrates the degree to which public law theories 
are bound up with politics and because it helps place the life cycle 
in epicyclical context. We noted above that some highly adulter-
ated theories that fall into senescence at T6 may reemerge at a 
later date.228 Friedman contends that political blocs will find 
themselves in need of a new legal theory at predictable junctures, 
when their attitudes toward judicial review change in response to 
the changing composition of the Court. The churn of the life cycle 
ensures a reserve of institutionally oriented, ideologically ambig-
uous theories from which such blocs can draw. Indeed, the sorts 
of legal theories most likely to undergo the life cycle are just the 
sorts of theories that Friedman suggests the politics of judicial 
review favor: theories that purport to transcend politics through 
“wide-reaching,” “structural” solutions.229 
If our life cycle model harmonizes with Friedman’s story in 
this way, it also gives reason to suspect that he overstates the 
“dilemma” of constitutional theory.230 The many constitutional 
 
 225 Friedman, 67 L & Contemp Probs at 157–64 (cited in note 224). 
 226 Id at 161–64. 
 227 As Friedman notes, the legal basis of conservative support for judicial activism in 
the early twentieth century was theoretically distinct from the basis of progressive support 
for judicial activism in the 1960s and afterward. Id at 157–59. 
 228 See Part II.C. 
 229 Friedman, 67 L & Contemp Probs at 171–74 (cited in note 224). 
 230 Id at 164–67. 
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scholars who traffic in structural solutions, Friedman warns, 
must either abandon their earlier theories of judicial review when 
the Court turns over or else “betray their own ideological val-
ues.”231 Yet as we have shown, the more wide-reaching and proce-
duralist a prescriptive theory, the more susceptible it will be to 
impurification. This dynamic allows for the sort of political re-
sponsiveness that Friedman predicts, but without the replacement 
of one theory by another that he assumes must accompany such 
responsiveness. A progressive scholar, for instance, may continue 
to endorse popular constitutionalism even if the Court turns 
sharply in a progressive direction, because legitimation by “the 
people themselves”—it will be claimed—can take any number of 
institutional forms. Similarly, large numbers of conservative 
originalists managed to adjust to the increasingly conservative 
composition of the Court without abandoning either originalism 
or their own ideological values, because legitimation by the con-
stitutional text does not—it came to be claimed—require a com-
mitment to judicial restraint.232 The impurification process contrib-
utes to intergenerational repetition and revisionism in 
constitutional scholarship, but it reduces the need for any given 
group of scholars to cycle between different theories in response 
to shifts in institutional politics. 
B. Analogues in Politics and Political Science 
For more than a century, political scientists and sociologists 
have studied the process of “goal displacement”233 by which organi-
zations that depend on mass support—political parties and trade 
unions in particular—tend to attenuate or abandon their initial 
policy objectives in order to broaden their membership.234 A re-
lated phenomenon is the attenuation or abandonment of policy 
 
 231 Id at 165. 
 232 Friedman’s chief example of theorists whose ideological values have been “be-
tray[ed]” by their intellectual views comes from the years immediately following the New 
Deal, when the commitment of left-leaning realists and process theorists to judicial defer-
ence put them out of step with an increasingly liberal Court and an increasingly conserva-
tive Congress. Id at 165–67. But realism in its original, antilegalist purity is long dead, 
and process theory proved to be much more flexible than its early adherents anticipated. 
 233 Darcy K. Leach, The Iron Law of What Again? Conceptualizing Oligarchy across 
Organizational Forms, 23 Sociological Theory 312, 318 (2005). 
 234 See Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical 
Tendencies of Modern Democracy 365–76 (Hearst’s International Library 1915) (Eden Paul 
and Cedar Paul, trans). See also Adam Przeworski, Capitalism and Social Democracy 102–
03 (Cambridge 1985) (noting how the “combination of minority status with majority rule” 
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objectives after political parties have achieved electoral success 
and entered government; this phenomenon is generally at-
tributed to the domination of party representatives by relatively 
autonomous state bureaucracies and their private-sector cli-
ents.235 These processes of political moderation were first noted, 
and have remained especially acute, with respect to European so-
cial democracies,236 but similar dynamics have been identified in 
the American political system.237 The advent of an era of party 
polarization in the United States238 has not necessarily blunted 
 
problem faced by class-based electoral parties results in the compromising of certain party 
values to broaden bases of support); Leo Panitch, Social Democracy & Industrial Mili-
tancy: The Labour Party, the Trade Unions and Incomes Policy, 1945–1974 235 (Cambridge 
1976) (diagnosing the British Labour Party’s trade union relationships as an indication of 
an “integrative” ideology beyond the party’s representation of the working class). 
 235 See, for example, Sidney M. Milkis, The President and the Parties: The Transfor-
mation of the American Party System since the New Deal 5–6 (Oxford 1993) (identifying 
an “inherent tension” between party politics and “an energetic executive” in the US sys-
tem); Nicos Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism 220–40 (NLB 2014) (Patrick Camiller, 
trans) (discussing the typical transformations of “parties of power” and noting how the 
“loosening of the ties of representation . . . accompanies changes in the institutional posi-
tion of the parties of power”) (emphases omitted); Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in 
Sociology 224–35 (Oxford 1946) (H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, trans and eds) (describ-
ing the influence of bureaucratic structures on conservative and liberal parties alike). 
 236 See, for example, Peter Mair, Ruling the Void: The Hollowing of Western Democ-
racy 60–73, 99–142 (Verso 2013) (assessing the decline of political parties and popular 
involvement in politics across western Europe). See also generally Panitch, Social Democ-
racy & Industrial Militancy (cited in note 234) (analyzing the British Labour Party); Jonas 
Pontusson, The Limits of Social Democracy: Investment Politics in Sweden (Cornell 1992) 
(considering reform initiatives pursued by the Swedish labor movement in the 1960s 
and 1970s). 
 237 See, for example, Milkis, The President and the Parties at 149–299 (cited in 
note 235) (evaluating the New Deal legacy for the American party system); Robert Brenner, 
The Paradox of Social Democracy: The American Case, in Mike Davis, Fred Pfeil, and Michael 
Sprinker, eds, The Year Left: An American Socialist Yearbook; 1985 32, 33–35 (Verso 1985) 
(noting the decline of radical liberal rhetoric since the 1960s in favor of more “realis[tic]” 
responses to economic crises). 
 238 See generally Alan I. Abramowitz, The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, 
Polarization, and American Democracy (Yale 2010); Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center 
Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 Cal L Rev 273 
(2011). Largely in response to this evidence of polarization, American political scientists 
have begun to challenge the model of hierarchically organized parties that dilute their 
ideological commitments to expand their social bases. See generally, for example, Hans 
Noel, Political Ideologies and Political Parties in America (Cambridge 2013); Kathleen 
Bawn, et al, A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and Nominations in 
American Politics, 10 Persp on Polit 571 (2012). 
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the tendency toward adulteration of policy agendas that accom-
panies the pursuit of party growth and the penetration of party 
representatives into government.239 
Processes of party moderation offer an interesting if rather 
indirect analogue to the life cycle of prescriptive legal theories. On 
the one hand, the goal displacement experienced by political par-
ties that seek to expand their base or enter government can be 
seen as the mirror image of the impurification experienced by theo-
ries such as originalism or popular constitutionalism. Parties in-
itially hold themselves out as politically radical, but their policy 
objectives are gradually adulterated by the moderating forces of 
a mass electorate and an autonomous state bureaucracy. Pre-
scriptive legal theories initially hold themselves out as above the 
political fray, but their proceduralist prescriptions are gradually 
adulterated as they accommodate a range of theoretical criticisms 
from participants in or around the political fray. Whereas adul-
teration in the first case proceeds through depoliticization, adulter-
ation in the second case proceeds through politicization. On the 
other hand, processes of party-ideology and legal-theory adulter-
ation can be seen as functionally identical. Both parties and theo-
ries adulterate their initial agendas in order to secure the support 
of broader constituencies (of voters or scholars) and particularly 
powerful groups of experts (entrenched bureaucrats and private-
sector interests in the case of parties, official decisionmakers in 
the case of theories). 
From either point of view, the comparison of political parties 
and legal theories highlights the fundamentally sociological ori-
entation of our life cycle account. This account does not reduce 
legal theories to the communities of scholars who espouse them, 
but neither does it treat them as formal sets of propositions di-
vorced from their shifting social bases. Prescriptive legal theories, 
much like political parties, are continually constituting and being 
reconstituted by the goals of their supporters. 
 
 239 See, for example, Vanessa Williamson, Theda Skocpol, and John Coggin, The Tea 
Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism, 9 Persp on Polit 25, 36 (2011) (noting 
the potential limits of Tea Party–driven Republican electoral success due to the “limited 
appeal to the broader American public” of the Tea Party’s conservative ideology, as well 
as the disaffection of Tea Party members with the failure of their “insurgent candidates” 
to achieve stated policy goals once in office). 
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C. Analogues in the History and Philosophy of Science 
The life cycle model also bears an interesting resemblance to 
some of the literature on theory change in the history and philos-
ophy of science. We have in mind especially Kuhn’s classic ac-
count of theory change in the natural sciences,240 although the as-
pect of his account that is most analogous to our model is shared 
by many other accounts of scientific theory change.241 This aspect 
is the claim that experimental falsifications of a given theory do 
not necessarily lead to the rejection of that theory so much as to 
the complication of its initial formulation.242 According to Kuhn, 
scientific “discovery” is nothing other than the adjustment of a 
preexisting theory to account for an “anomaly,” or “the recognition 
that nature has somehow violated the [ ] expectations” of the 
theory.243 Confronted with such violations, scientists do not dis-
card their theory but rather “devise numerous articulations and 
ad hoc modifications of their theory”244 until “the anomalous has 
become the expected.”245 
This process of scientific discovery through theoretical ad-
justment can, in the long run, lead to the abandonment of one 
theory and the adoption of an alternative: that is, a scientific rev-
olution. But first, the incumbent theory must enter a period of 
“crisis.” During the critical phase of a theory’s life, anomalies—
and the theoretical adjustments they require—mount at such a rate 
and to such an extent that the “complexity” of the theory “increas[es] 
 
 240 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago 2d ed 1970). See 
also generally Thomas S. Kuhn, The Road since Structure, in Thomas S. Kuhn, The Road 
since Structure: Philosophical Essays, 1970–1993, with an Autobiographical Interview 90 
(Chicago 2000) (James Conant and John Haugeland, eds). 
 241 See generally, for example, Barry Barnes, Scientific Knowledge and Sociological 
Theory (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1974); Collins, Changing Order (cited in note 4); Paul 
Feyerabend, Against Method: Outline of an Anarchist Theory of Knowledge (NLB 1975); 
Imre Lakatos, Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, in 
Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge 91 
(Cambridge 1970). 
 242 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions at 52–53, 77–78, 146–47 (cited in 
note 240). This claim most directly challenged Professor Karl Popper’s identification of 
“falsifiability” as the necessary condition of a properly “scientific” theory. See Karl R. Popper, 
The Logic of Scientific Discovery 17–20 (Basic Books 1959). 
 243 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions at 52–53 (cited in note 240). 
 244 Id at 78. 
 245 Id at 53. 
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far more rapidly than its accuracy[,] and [ ] a discrepancy cor-
rected in one place [is] likely to show up in another.”246 For exam-
ple, in the decades before Antoine Lavoisier’s oxygen theory of 
combustion displaced the earlier phlogiston theory,247 “the net re-
sult of [combustion] experiments” had been a chemical typology 
“so elaborate that the phlogiston theory proved increasingly little 
able to cope with laboratory experience.”248 While none of the lead-
ing chemists of the day “suggested that the [phlogiston] theory 
should be replaced, they were unable to apply it consistently.”249 
As a result, by the time Lavoisier came along, “there were almost 
as many versions of the phlogiston theory as there were pneu-
matic chemists” conducting combustion experiments.250 
Kuhn notes that this “proliferation of versions of a theory is 
a very usual symptom of crisis.”251 Another symptom is the in-
creasing resemblance between the theory in crisis and earlier theo-
ries that were thought to have been superseded.252 Such critical 
symptoms are not, however, sufficient to lead scientists to aban-
don the incumbent theory. “[A] scientific theory is declared invalid 
only if an alternate candidate is available to take its place. . . . 
The decision to reject one [theory] is always simultaneously the 
decision to accept another.”253 
Our life cycle account of legal theories parallels Kuhn’s ac-
count of natural scientific theory change in significant ways, but 
sharply diverges from it in at least one crucial respect.254 The most 
striking parallel is the idea that a theory develops through im-
purification—through the introduction of unexpected provisos 
and the modification, or even abandonment, of formerly central 
 
 246 Id at 68. 
 247 Before oxygen was discovered, phlogiston theory held that a chemical called 
“phlogiston” was released when something was burned. See Kuhn, The Structure of Scien-
tific Revolutions at 66–72 (cited in note 240). 
 248 Id at 70. 
 249 Id. 
 250 Id. 
 251 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions at 71 (cited in note 240). See also id 
at 74. 
 252 Id at 72. 
 253 Id at 77. 
 254 Kuhn himself discussed the limited applicability of his account to the social or 
human sciences. In his view, the key difference between the natural and social sciences is 
that, in the former, there is a “relative scarcity of competing schools” at any given time. Id 
at 208–09. Whereas a mature natural science tends to be dominated by one “theory,” “par-
adigm,” or “disciplinary matrix,” a mature social science can flourish without a single gov-
erning paradigm. Id at 182–87. 
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tenets. This process might tend to be faster or more contentious 
in law than in natural science on account of factors such as the 
volume of legal scholarship, the adversarial nature of legal dis-
course, and the political stakes of public law. But the basic struc-
ture of theory change is similar. Furthermore, on both accounts, 
the process of impurification is occasioned by resistance to the theory 
as it exists at a given moment in time. In Kuhn’s narrative, re-
sistance comes from “nature” in the form of physical phenomena 
at odds with the theory’s expectations.255 In the life cycle, resistance 
comes from society in the form of legal, political, and moral objec-
tions leveled at the theory by other theorists and practitioners. 
Although there is a logical symmetry between these two 
kinds of resistance, their ontologically distinct character leads to 
a sharp divergence between Kuhn’s depiction of theory change 
and our own. For Kuhn, the boundary between periods of “normal 
science” and periods of “crisis”256 is not only sharply drawn but 
also normatively significant; the validity of natural science de-
pends on it. During periods of “normal science,” the theoretical 
adjustments occasioned by “anomalous” physical phenomena pro-
duce scientific “discoveries” and are thus all to the good.257 During 
periods of “crisis,” however, a proliferation of anomalies leads to 
“pronounced professional insecurity” and an experience of “per-
sistent failure” among scientists, as their theory becomes experi-
mentally unwieldy and internally inconsistent.258 Although it will 
not be discarded until a superior alternative emerges, such a 
“monster”259 theory is felt to be fundamentally if indescribably at 
odds with nature and thus an embarrassment to the profession. 
The life cycle of legal theories can admit no such sharp dis-
tinction between periods of normal science and crisis, between in-
trinsically legitimating and delegitimating theoretical modifica-
tions. To be sure, the process of impurification may produce legal 
theories that increasingly fail to influence crucial decisionmakers 
or that are criticized for incoherence or bad faith.260 But there is 
 
 255 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions at 52–53 (cited in note 240). 
 256 Id at 74–75. 
 257 Id at 62–65. 
 258 Id at 67–68. 
 259 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions at 69 (cited in note 240). 
 260 See David E. Pozen, Constitutional Bad Faith, 129 Harv L Rev 885, 918–39 (2016) 
(discussing the role of accusations of bad faith in constitutional debates generally); id at 
946 n 304 (discussing accusations of bad faith directed at liberal originalist scholarship 
specifically). 
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no truly external standard against which a theoretical modifica-
tion can be deemed to have come up short. There are only other 
scholars and practitioners who may accept or reject the theory in 
its currently adulterated form. Normal science in the legal com-
munity—as perhaps in all social scientific and humanistic en-
deavors—is always in a critical phase.261 
There are historians and philosophers of science who argue 
that this reflexivity characterizes the natural sciences as well—
that we lack the epistemological resources to draw any fundamen-
tal distinction between the natural and social sciences on the ba-
sis of the existence of a nonhuman nature.262 Kuhn is not one of 
them, though. He denies the falsifiability of natural scientific theo-
ries for the reason that no “anomalous” natural phenomenon will 
invalidate a scientific theory in the absence of a superior, alter-
native theory offered by human hands.263 But he also rejects thor-
oughgoing social constructivism.264 Nature is out there, Kuhn in-
sists, a source of phenomena that can be described in a variety of 
different ways but that cannot be persuaded out of existence.265 It 
is nature, in the last instance, that dictates a theory’s descent 
from normal science into crisis and therefore, potentially, super-
session through revolution. 
In the absence of such a dictatorial nature, the only force that 
can cause a highly adulterated legal theory to “go bad”—and be 
 
 261 See Winch, The Idea of a Social Science at 88 (cited in note 4): 
If we are going to compare the social student to an engineer, we shall do better 
to compare him to an apprentice engineer who is studying what engineering . . . 
is all about. His understanding of social phenomena is more like the engineer’s 
understanding of his colleagues’ activities than it is like the engineer’s under-
standing of the mechanical systems which he studies. 
 262 See generally, for example, Barnes, Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory 
(cited in note 241); Collins, Changing Order (cited in note 4). 
 263 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions at 77, 146–47 (cited in note 240). 
 264 See, for example, Kuhn, The Road since Structure at 91 (cited in note 240) (criti-
cizing “the excesses of postmodernist movements like the strong program [in the sociology 
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 265 See, for example, Thomas S. Kuhn, Reflections on My Critics, in Lakatos and Musgrave, 
eds, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge 231, 263 (cited in note 241) (“[N]ature cannot 
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seen to require discarding—is the negative judgment of other le-
gal theorists and practitioners. The next Part considers in further 
detail some of the reasons theorists and practitioners may have 
for making, or declining to make, such a negative judgment. 
V.  LESSONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
What does it say about a legal culture that its leading pre-
scriptive theories tend to work themselves impure in the ways we 
have described? If the life cycle model captures something true 
about the development of legal movements, then this question 
warrants sustained investigation and reflection. We focus on two 
implications here. At a macro level, we suggest, the life cycle plays 
a generally salutary role in moderating the pace of legal change 
and maintaining a productive tension between law and politics. 
At a micro level, the life cycle underscores the need to look beyond 
the four corners of any given legal theory to understand the work 
it is doing. As the examples of originalism and CBA demonstrate 
in particular, adulterated theories may exert powerful disciplinary 
effects on legal scholarship and practice even after they have 
abandoned many of their initial assumptions and prescriptions, 
and even after they have failed to achieve their initial normative 
goals. 
A. The Conservatism of Legal Theory 
When public law theorists propose to resolve a politically 
fraught legal conflict by advancing a new decision procedure or 
decisionmaking ideal, the stakes can seem quite high. The rela-
tionship between legal theory and legal practice is uncertain and 
complex, of course, and theorists may be inclined to overstate 
their influence. Nonetheless, as the case studies in Part III re-
flect, the sociological connections between the legal academy, the 
courts, and the administrative state are close enough to enable a 
prescriptive theory of public law, under the right conditions, to 
move quickly from the law reviews and lecture halls to the United 
States Reports and the Federal Register. Yet as our case studies 
also reflect, the ultimate impact of such a theory’s adoption is un-
likely to prove as normatively significant as one might assume at 
the outset. Prescriptive legal theories tend to succeed only after 
running the gauntlet of the life cycle; by the time they achieve 
widespread acceptance, their leading formulations look very 
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different from their initial formulations. The theories come to re-
capitulate rather than resolve the underlying conflict in which 
they intervened. 
It follows that the early proponents and opponents of these 
theories may not be playing for stakes that are as high as they 
think. The former can hope to achieve only partial victory. As time 
goes by, theories such as originalism, textualism, popular consti-
tutionalism, and CBA end up not so much displacing as encom-
passing rival approaches such as living constitutionalism, pur-
posivism, departmentalism, and qualitative analysis. If 
proponents of prescriptive legal theories find this observation to 
be chastening, opponents might find it a source of comfort—and 
power. Critics of ascendant theoretical movements, we have seen, 
may be able to “win through losing”266 by prompting concessions 
and tempering the perceived excesses of a disfavored theory. 
While an appreciation of the life cycle may counsel a certain real-
ism about legal reform, it does not justify fatalism or quiescence. 
The life cycle model also helps to illustrate why it is a fallacy 
of composition267 to assume that if certain leading theorists or theo-
ries seem “radical” at any given time,268 legal theory as a collective 
enterprise will be radical as well. The dialectic of impurification 
tends, instead, to push legal movements in more inclusive and 
conciliatory directions. To focus solely on a specific group of legal 
theory entrepreneurs or their specific proposals is to miss the 
myriad external forces that will inevitably rework their ideas, 
compromise their objectives, and condition their influence. A dy-
namic perspective is needed to understand the aggregate effects 
of such theorizing. 
 
 266 For a thoughtful analysis of “winning through losing” scenarios in public law liti-
gation, see generally Douglas NeJaime, Winning through Losing, 96 Iowa L Rev 941 (2011). 
 267 See Adrian Vermeule, The Supreme Court 2008 Term—Foreword: System Effects 
and the Constitution, 123 Harv L Rev 4, 44–72 (2009) (discussing the fallacies of composi-
tion and division commonly made by public law scholars). 
 268 See, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, Radicals in Robes: Why Extreme Right-Wing 
Courts Are Wrong for America 9–34 (Basic Books 2005) (describing proponents of original-
ism as “radicals,” “extremists,” and “fundamentalists”); Harry T. Edwards, The Growing 
Disjunction between Legal Education and the Legal Profession: A Postscript, 91 Mich L 
Rev 2191, 2199 (1993) (“Many, although not all, of the legal theorists would like to bring 
about a radical transformation of society.”); Kathryn M. Stanchi and Jan M. Levine, Gen-
der and Legal Writing: Law Schools’ Dirty Little Secrets, 16 Berkeley Women’s L J 1, 3 n 2 
(2001) (“The radicalism of American law professors is so legendary that it has led one 
commentator to joke that the only Marxists left in the ‘entire world’ teach in American 
universities.”). 
 1882  The University of Chicago Law Review [83:1819 
   
The life cycle theory itself ought to be considered in a dynamic 
perspective. We have emphasized that the susceptibility of pre-
scriptive public law theories to impurification is partly a conse-
quence of the form they generally take: process oriented and si-
lent on the values that animate the conflicts they seek to resolve. 
As discussed in Part I, an especially bullish market for public law 
theories that purport to offer a depoliticized proceduralism has 
existed since the 1980s. This market is attributable to a series of 
contingent historical events: the failure of New Deal–era legal re-
alism to secure the autonomy and primacy of the legal profession 
within the administrative state; the critique of the legal process 
school’s assumption of an underlying cultural consensus on the 
nature of rationality and democracy; and the backlash against the 
strongly normative legal theorizing of the 1960s and 1970s.269 If 
mainstream public law theorizing were to become more openly 
ideological or outcome oriented, then the life cycle might no longer 
loom so large. Perhaps the tendency of prescriptive public law theo-
ries to work themselves impure will wane in the years ahead. 
Perhaps, but we are doubtful. The norm—and the rhetorical 
utility—of claiming political neutrality has a long pedigree in 
American public law,270 and we can detect few signs of a nascent 
retreat from proceduralism and depoliticization in current schol-
arship. The life cycle model could lose most of its descriptive and 
predictive power one day, but it would take a sea change in our 
legal culture. 
All of this may seem rather dispiriting insofar as it under-
scores the limits of legal theory and the obstacles to legal change. 
Those who believe that public law decisionmaking needs funda-
mental reform may be especially exasperated by the life cycle: one 
can hear this exasperation in the laments of “old-time” original-
ists that the theory has “lost its soul,”271 or in the insistence of 
 
 269 See Part I.A. 
 270 See, for example, John Denvir, William Shakespeare and the Jurisprudence of 
Comedy, 39 Stan L Rev 825, 825 (1987) (describing constitutional theory’s “ceaseless 
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wealth maximization or popular sovereignty; they have not reverted to the more funda-
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theories “abstract” and “proceduralist” is their relative neutrality—their neutrality with 
respect to the values constitutive of a given politicized legal conflict. 
 271 See notes 83–85 and accompanying text (quoting Professor Steven Smith). For ex-
amples of similar laments, see Nelson Lund, Living Originalism: The Magical Mystery 
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economically minded theorists that deontological considerations 
simply cannot be a part of CBA.272 Yet while the impurification of 
any given theory is likely to strike many as suboptimal, the evo-
lutionary pattern that we describe has some significant benefits 
for the legal system as a whole. The crises that felled legal realism 
and legal process are conventionally thought to have stemmed 
from a failure to manage the inextricable yet antagonistic rela-
tionship between law and politics; legal realism was insufficiently 
attentive to law, while legal process was insufficiently attentive 
to politics. The thoroughgoing politicization of law and the thor-
oughgoing legalization of politics both left lawyers in a protracted 
state of bad faith, either denying their own social and economic 
privilege as a distinctive professional class or denying the politi-
cal conditions that underwrote that privilege. The contemporary 
mode of prescriptive legal theorizing, in contrast, allows lawyers 
to be lawyers even as it ceaselessly exposes them to the vicissi-
tudes of politics. By proposing abstract theories about how legal 
decisions should be reached, lawyers exercise their core compe-
tencies. By having to adulterate these theories in response to po-
litically charged critiques, lawyers are forced to acknowledge the 
empirical and normative limits of their capacity to solve public 
problems. 
More importantly, through the life cycles (and epicycles) that 
legal theories undergo, law regenerates itself. Even if the contro-
versies in which they intervene are ultimately irresolvable by 
law, legal theories’ tendency to supply process-oriented solutions 
that then undergo impurification keeps law “in the game.” Law is 
neither so powerful that it stifles major value conflicts, nor so in-
flexible that political actors demand an abandonment of it alto-
gether. The dynamism of individual public law theories thus sup-
ports an overarching conservatism and stability in public law 
practice—not because the law itself is purified in a Burkean fash-
ion through durable traditions that generate better and better 
 
Tour, 3 Tex A&M L Rev 31, 43 (2015) (“[T]o marry originalism and living constitutionalism 
. . . leaves originalism itself in a condition akin to the legal death married women experi-
enced under the old rules of coverture. Quite a victory.”); Joel Alicea, Originalism and the 
Rule of the Dead, 23 Natl Aff 149, 161 (2015) (arguing that originalism’s legacy “is now 
imperiled by the rise of novel originalist theories”). 
 272 See notes 198–203 and accompanying text. 
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judgments,273 but rather because legal innovation is perpetually 
tempered by political and professional feedback, and political con-
test is perpetually rerouted through law. 
While public law may not work itself pure, then, the impuri-
fication of influential prescriptive theories both reflects and rein-
forces its responsiveness to public deliberation and debate. This 
interpretation of the life cycle as part of a salutary, dialogic pro-
cess of legal development echoes familiar accounts of the (passa-
bly) democratic character of Anglo-American common law.274 The 
irony of contemporary prescriptive theories is that, in trying to 
cabin legal discretion through formalistic, high-level frameworks, 
these theories end up catalyzing the sort of incremental contesta-
tion and transformation celebrated by defenders of discretionary, 
common-law decisionmaking. 
B. The Double Life of Successful Legal Theories 
In light of the life cycle, the persistence of the best-known 
prescriptive legal theories presents something of a puzzle. These 
theories manage to secure a broad following only after abandon-
ing, or at least substantially modifying, the normative commit-
ments and practical proposals that recommended the theories in 
the first place. At their inception, originalism, textualism, and 
CBA promised to simplify and constrain judicial, executive, and 
scholarly resolution of public law debates, while partly insulating 
decisionmakers from the war of first-order values that under-
girded those debates. Today, these theories’ decision procedures 
balloon with exceptions, metaprocedures, and side constraints. 
Not only do such baroque frameworks fail to simplify or constrain 
the work of decision; they actually dramatize the value-laden con-
flicts that the early proponents of these theories had promised to 
 
 273 See Michael S. Moore, The Dead Hand of Constitutional Tradition, 19 Harv J L & 
Pub Pol 263, 269 (1996) (drawing a connection between Edmund Burke’s faith in incre-
mentalism and in the wisdom of tradition and Lord Mansfield’s idea that the common law 
works itself pure). 
 274 See, for example, Gerald J. Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part 
II), 3 Oxford U Commonwealth L J 1, 7–11 (2003) (discussing the classical understanding 
of common-law reasoning as deliberative, public, and shared); Matthew Steilen, The Dem-
ocratic Common Law, 10 J Juris 437, 438 (2011) (arguing that “common-law adjudication 
mimics the deliberative process that gives enacted law its legitimacy”). 
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defuse.275 Such conflicts now take place within the highly adulter-
ated procedural field of our most influential public law theories. 
The puzzle is why certain theories that fail to achieve their initial 
goals nonetheless gain and sustain such broad support, and what 
work this strange form of success accomplishes. 
1. An exogenous hypothesis for theory persistence. 
These questions suggest the outlines of a program of empiri-
cal research, one that we commend but cannot undertake here. 
We propose, however, that such a program begin with the follow-
ing hypothesis: highly adulterated legal theories persist to a large 
degree because of the work they do “off the page”—serving inter-
ests and ideals that are exogenous to the theories’ stated norms. 
However elegant or powerful it might be, the internal logic of a 
theory like originalism or CBA is unable to provide a satisfying 
basis for explaining the theory’s persistence, given how compro-
mised and contested that logic eventually becomes. It seems to us 
more likely that prescriptive legal theories have second-order 
(and third- and fourth-order) effects on the world that cannot nec-
essarily be gleaned from their academic expositions, and that 
these effects are in fact what determine their fate at the end of 
the life cycle. 
What might this look like in practice? CBA, some have sug-
gested, tends to enhance the power and prestige of economists and 
their allies within the legal academy and the administrative 
state.276 Even when seemingly noneconomic values such as dig-
nity are incorporated within the cost-benefit calculus, the very 
form of the calculus exerts a disciplinary effect, privileging a cer-
tain mode of expertise and a certain vision of the administrative 
state that marginalizes alternative visions. Similarly, originalism 
and textualism may tend to enhance the power and prestige of 
 
 275 For its part, popular constitutionalism initially promised not just to constrain but 
to marginalize judicial resolution of constitutional debates, and yet it is now invoked by 
some to justify vigorous judicial review of unpopular or “jurispathic” federal legislation. 
See Part III.C. 
 276 See, for example, Elizabeth Magill and Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power within 
Agencies, 120 Yale L J 1032, 1051 (2011) (“[CBA] expands the range within which econo-
mists, scientists, and other nonlegal professionals effectively choose agency policy.”). See 
also id at 1080 (“Once lawyers, scientists, or economists—or any other professionals—are 
employed to cope with a particular issue, they become major stakeholders within agencies, 
and their influence can seep out laterally to encompass issues other than the one for which 
they were originally conscripted.”). 
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lawyers as a privileged expert class, while raising barriers to en-
try for nonlegal actors. Originalism may also serve the interests 
of American elites more generally, at home and abroad, insofar as 
it implies that American power is constrained by an age-old set of 
universally appealing principles of good governance.277 
Even the diversity and discord that frequently characterize 
highly adulterated legal theories may produce exogenous effects 
that favor their persistence. Take, for example, the potentially 
productive tension between byzantine academic defenses of a 
late-stage theory and the existence in popular discourse of a sim-
pler, idealized version of that theory. Several scholars have pos-
ited just such a double life in the case of originalism.278 On this 
account, the professional embrace of a theory, in an impure form, 
lends intellectual legitimacy to its popular variant.279 In turn, the 
political appeal of the popular variant stimulates demand for the 
continuing professional use of the theory, however great the dis-
crepancy between the popular and professional versions may be.280 
In a related vein, there may be situations in which two mu-
tually reinforcing versions of a theory, one much “purer” than the 
other, exist within the professional legal community. We noted in 
Part III, for example, that while CBA has become endlessly com-
plicated and compromised in law journals and in high-profile legal 
documents such as Executive Order 13563, federal administrators 
may continue to deploy a relatively pure, efficiency-maximizing 
 
 277 See Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 Georgetown L J 657, 708, 714 (2009) 
(arguing that originalism’s success “in the methodologies market” is attributable in part 
to the theory’s “emphatic, irreducible ‘American-ness’”); Aziz Rana, Constitutionalism and 
the Foundations of the Security State, 103 Cal L Rev 335, 352–81 (2015) (attributing the 
rise of “constitutionalism” in twentieth-century America to the efforts of internationalist 
lawyers and politicians to distinguish their expansionist projects from imperialism). 
 278 See, for example, Greene, 72 Ohio St L J at 1192–93 (cited in note 50); Michael 
Dorf, Canonical Case Skepticism and the Cartoon Version of Nonoriginalism (Dorf on Law, 
Oct 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/4RK5-T6SC. 
 279 To the extent that prescriptive public law theorizing is trending toward the style 
of scholarly erudition that Professor Schlag has labeled “knowledge production,” the ef-
fects of intellectual legitimation may become all the greater as the distance between the 
academic and popular variants of a theory expand. See Pierre Schlag, The Knowledge Bub-
ble—a Diagnostic for Expertopia *2–4 (Colorado Law Legal Studies Research Paper No 15-
19, Mar 4, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/CKY6-VBHW. 
 280 This dialectic may at times lead to the reintroduction of the normatively purer, 
popular variant into professional usage. For example, Professor Michael Dorf has sug-
gested that the “more intellectually defensible versions of originalism,” which lack clear 
ideological content, “give[ ] cover to the conservative judges and politicians who invoke 
‘originalism’ generically”—that is, in the vulgate. Dorf, Canonical Case Skepticism (cited 
in note 278). 
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variant of CBA in practice.281 In this case, the presence of the 
adulterated form of CBA—which ostensibly incorporates dignity, 
fairness, and other such “soft” variables into the analysis—may 
help to legitimate and shield from scrutiny the continuing, con-
troversial primacy of efficiency maximization within certain 
agencies. 
2. Alternative hypotheses. 
Other hypotheses deserve consideration. It is tempting to ex-
plain the persistence of highly adulterated legal theories in a 
much more deflationary manner, as a story of path dependence 
and transaction costs: once a theory wins sufficient popularity, its 
opponents feel compelled to engage with the theory on its own 
terms, which means learning the language. And once the relevant 
scholars and officials have learned the language, it is simply eas-
ier for everyone to go on speaking it, rearticulating their funda-
mental disagreements through its prism.282 This deflationary ac-
count of theory persistence, however, is insufficient for at least 
two reasons. 
First, it has few resources to explain why some highly adul-
terated legal theories flourish whereas others recede into obscu-
rity. For instance, despite similar initial commitments to judicial 
restraint and popular sovereignty, and an equally if not more sim-
plistic decisional formalism, popular constitutionalism seems to 
be waning at this time while originalism reigns supreme.283 The 
best the deflationary account can do is demonstrate that original-
ism arrived on the scene first, and that a transition to popular 
constitutionalism therefore would have required new learning. 
Yet this explanation depends on the assumption that only one le-
gal theory is dominant, or widely spoken, at a given time. While 
that assumption might well be warranted in the natural sciences, 
 
 281 See notes 204–12 and accompanying text. 
 282 Such a dynamic likely reinforces theory persistence to some extent in all disci-
plines, but one would expect it to have the most bite in those disciplines in which the costs 
of theory change are so high that the theorists themselves cannot possibly afford them. 
See, for example, Collins, Changing Order at 160 (cited in note 4) (noting with regard to 
the physical sciences that “[i]n times of financial stringency the risky, extraordinary phase 
of science is likely to suffer disproportionately,” leading to a halt in “[t]he progress and 
development of scientific expertise”). 
 283 See note 57 and accompanying text. 
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it is much less plausible in the social sciences.284 Our suggested 
hypothesis, on the other hand, can explain the waning of popular 
constitutionalism in terms of the poor fit between its decision pro-
cedure—which even in its adulterated formulations continues to 
exalt “the people themselves”—and the interests of legal elites. 
The second problem with the deflationary account is that a 
focus on path dependence and transaction costs ignores the dyna-
mism of widely accepted prescriptive legal theories. As we have 
seen, these theories gain acceptance through an iterated process 
of adaptation and adulteration, which demands a constant open-
ness to challenge and capacity for change. Yet the deflationary 
account explains the persistence of such theories on the ground 
that theoretical learning is prohibitively expensive. While it could 
be the case that learning is cheap until a theory succeeds and only 
then becomes prohibitively expensive, the successful theories we 
have surveyed do not demonstrate any sharp break between a pe-
riod of experimentation and a period of entrenchment. Prescrip-
tive legal theories continue to adulterate or they fade away. 
While the deflationary account of theory persistence has little 
to recommend it, another alternative account deserves more seri-
ous consideration, and serves as a useful check on our hypothesis 
that exogenous factors are likely to explain which adulterated 
theories persist and which do not. This internalist account hy-
pothesizes that (i) there exists in any persistent, highly adulter-
ated theory a “hard core”—a durable set of propositions and prac-
tices—that remains relatively unaffected by impurification; and 
(ii) it is the practical utility or normative validity of this hard core 
that motivates the theory’s popularity and longevity. In other 
words, the internalist account suggests that when highly adulter-
ated theories persist, they do so because they really have suc-
ceeded on their own initial terms, pared down to those terms’ 
most essential elements.285 
 
 284 See note 254 (discussing Professor Kuhn’s view that the natural sciences, in con-
trast to the social sciences, tend to be dominated by one theoretical school at any particular 
moment in time). 
 285 This explanation of legal theory persistence in terms of a successful “hard core” 
mirrors the philosopher of science Imre Lakatos’s response to Kuhn’s account of theory 
change in the natural sciences. Lakatos accepted the contention that scientists will gener-
ally make ad hoc adjustments to their theory in the face of experimental falsification ra-
ther than abandon the theory altogether. But, he argued, there are always some theoreti-
cal propositions—a theory’s hard core—that are so essential to the theory that they cannot 
be abandoned; experimental falsification of these propositions, accordingly, would neces-
sarily result in abandonment of the theory itself. Theories persist so long as their hard 
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The plausibility of such an internalist explanation gains sup-
port from certain features of the life cycle model itself. As dis-
cussed in Part I.C, however adulterated a given theory may be-
come, its increasingly diverse proponents generally remain 
committed to the theory’s initial decisional formalism. (Original-
ists do not abandon the decisional centrality of the constitutional 
text; cost-benefit analysts do not abandon the decisional central-
ity of a calculus of trade-offs; and so forth.) It is because of this 
persistence of a theory’s initial decisional formalism that we are 
able to identify the theory as persisting at all, as opposed to be-
coming some other theory or disappearing altogether. 
Accordingly, internalists can argue, it is wrong to say that a 
theory has abandoned its initial normative commitments at T6, as 
the theory remains committed to the norms intrinsic to its formal-
ism. If this is the case, then the theory’s persistence may be ex-
plained by broad acceptance of those norms, which in turn may be 
explained by their validity or utility in guiding legal decisionmaking. 
In the case of textualism, for instance, the resilient hard core 
might include a prescription such as “pay careful attention to 
statutory text when interpreting a statute.” Textualists today 
may no longer share most of the normative commitments that the 
legal community associated with textualism in the 1980s. But the 
commitment to paying careful attention to statutory text re-
mains. And the felicity of that commitment could explain why 
more and more people have become textualists over time. 
Such an internalist explanation is intuitively appealing. We 
are happy to concede both the existence of such a minimal hard 
core and the likelihood that it plays some causal role in the per-
sistence of otherwise-adulterated prescriptive legal theories. 
Nonetheless, we do not think this hypothesis offers an actual al-
ternative to our own hypothesis. For one thing, we are skeptical 
about the extent to which minimal prescriptions such as “pay 
careful attention to statutory text when interpreting a statute” 
have normative or practical significance for legal decisionmaking. 
On the margins, such a prescription, if internalized by officials, 
could certainly affect their approach to legal questions. But it is 
hard to see how such an indeterminate norm could do more sub-
stantial work in guiding legal decision. One does not need to be a 
thoroughgoing skeptic about the concepts of legal “validity” and 
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“utility” to wonder whether the appeal of such a maxim has less 
to do with its normative or practical payoffs than with its rhetorical 
power—its resonance with social expectations and self-conceptions 
about the lawyer’s or judge’s role. To push the point further, ex-
planation of an adulterated theory’s persistence in terms of the 
appeal of its hard core of minimal prescriptions may just be ex-
planation of that theory’s persistence in terms of exogenous fac-
tors: the second-order benefits that accrue to those legal theorists 
and practitioners who commit to norms that are socially or pro-
fessionally celebrated but legally indeterminate. 
Moreover, even if one were to accept that an adulterated 
theory’s unchanging, minimal prescriptions enjoy widespread 
support because of the work they do in guiding legal decision, the 
internalist explanation of theory persistence would still face an-
other challenge. This challenge arises from the contrast between 
the overall complexity of an adulterated theory at T6 and the sim-
plicity and generality of its hard core. Given this contrast, the in-
ternalist needs to explain why legal actors attracted to such a 
theory’s minimal prescriptions would choose to take on board the 
theory as a whole. There is no need to adopt the theory of textu-
alism to “pay careful attention to statutory text when interpreting 
a statute” or to believe that this prescription should be heeded 
throughout the legal community. This prescription predates the 
rise of modern textualist theory, and it is embraced by many 
scholars and judges who are not identified with that theory. “Pay 
careful attention to statutory text when interpreting a statute” 
may well be a normatively and practically appealing maxim, but 
this appeal does not itself explain why scholars and practition-
ers would affiliate themselves with the complex and even self-
contradictory theory that textualism has become. 
In responding to this challenge, we suspect the internalist 
would have to draw on some version of the deflationary hypothe-
sis sketched above. It could be argued, for instance, that while 
textualism’s minimal prescriptions may seem generic, they 
gained new prominence within the legal community thanks to the 
emergence of textualist theory, and as a result it would be more 
time-consuming or otherwise costly at this point to disavow the 
theory while maintaining its minimal prescriptions. In addition 
to the weaknesses of the deflationary hypothesis already identi-
fied, the problem with this argument from path dependency is 
that, given the complexity of a highly adulterated legal theory, it 
is difficult to imagine that it would be more costly to disavow the 
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theory while maintaining its minimal prescriptions than to main-
tain both. However normatively or practically appealing such a 
theory’s hard core, it thus seems unlikely to be able to explain the 
persistence of the theory as a whole. 
3. New directions for public law research (and resistance). 
To summarize: in light of the weaknesses of alternative ex-
planations, the exogenous hypothesis—that highly adulterated 
legal theories persist because they serve interests and ideals that 
are not compassed by the theories themselves—strikes us as the 
most useful starting point for further empirical work. 
If this hypothesis proves correct, it would warrant an im-
portant caveat to Part V.A’s relatively optimistic take on the life 
cycle. To whatever extent highly adulterated theories persist be-
cause they serve interests and ideals “off the page,” such persis-
tence will not merely recapitulate the legal and political status 
quo. Instead, it will subtly shift the balance of social and economic 
forces within the status quo. At T6 of the life cycle, some legal ac-
tors will be in a more powerful position than they were at T1, and 
so will be better equipped to resolve the underlying dispute on 
favorable terms. Recapitulating a debate about the definition and 
enforcement of fundamental rights through an originalist lens 
could influence the ultimate outcome of the debate insofar as a 
bipartisan embrace of originalism enhances the persuasive au-
thority of certain lawyers—for example, those steeped in Founding-
era history—or links the question of rights to a certain vision of 
American nationalism or exceptionalism. On multiple levels, 
then, adulterated theories may exert disciplinary effects on the 
legal academy and the practice of law even when they fail to 
achieve their internal goals—altering not only which sorts of law-
yers (and nonlawyers) are in or out, up or down, but also which 
styles of research, rhetoric, and justification have more or less 
currency. These effects operate at the level of ideas and institu-
tions, not just individual reputations and aesthetics. 
A new research program for public law scholarship might in-
vestigate these dynamics within the framework of the life cycle 
model. The life cycle suggests that systematic scrutiny of the indirect 
and unintended effects of prescriptive legal theories is integral to 
understanding why these theories succeed, and to assessing the 
costs of that success. At the same time, the life cycle does not sug-
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gest that it is misguided or vainglorious for legal theory entrepre-
neurs to think they can change the world, as well as their own 
professional and public standing, by introducing new “isms” that 
gain a wide following. The vision of success that motivates such 
entrepreneurs, however, may be surprisingly unrelated—or even 
antagonistic—to the kinds of legal and political change that a 
widely accepted theory ends up producing. 
For similar reasons, our account does not suggest that it is 
misguided for critics of prescriptive legal theories to resist them. 
Such resistance is what leads to impurification. Moreover, by tak-
ing a hard line against the adoption of disfavored theories, in any 
form, critics might be able to limit the indirect social and political 
transformations that are the most lasting effects of theoretical 
victory. 
CONCLUSION 
In arguing that process-oriented legal theories tend to share 
a common life cycle, we do not mean to deny the place of contin-
gency in legal development. We cannot predict what the next big 
prescriptive legal theory will be. But the analysis here does give 
a basis to predict that, whatever normative dividends this theory 
promises to deliver at the outset, it will become more ideologically 
amorphous and internally conflicted—and less dissimilar to the 
rival theories that preceded it—over the course of the years that 
follow. 
If this Article’s central argument is correct, it has broad im-
plications both for how we should understand the function of legal 
theorizing and for how we should evaluate and engage the legal 
theories around us. To the extent that a process-oriented theory 
really does pose a significant threat to its opponents, we can now 
see that this threat does not stem from the significant normative 
values it initially neglects, as those values are apt to be incorpo-
rated into the theory. Rather, the deeper threat lies in the indi-
rect—and often unintended—ways in which the theory’s advance-
ment may reshape legal culture. One upshot is a need for more 
externalist approaches to legal argument. When the next big pub-
lic law theory comes along, commentators would do well to focus 
not only on the merits of its initial decisionmaking framework but 
also on the social, political, and ideological effects that such a 
framework’s adulterated descendants could foster, down the line. 
